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EVALUATION REPORT



**UDF-BGD-09-318 – Promoting Good Governance among Tribal Inhabitants in
Bangladesh (PROGGATI)**

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All of the photos shown in this report are from Green Hill reporting.

All errors and omissions remain the responsibility of the authors.

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The views expressed in this report are those of the evaluators. They do not represent those of UNDEF or of any of the institutions referred to in the report.

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I. Executive Summary

(i) Project Data

The *Promoting Good Governance among Tribal Inhabitants in Bangladesh (PROGGATI)* project sought to build pro-poor, gender sensitive, good governance in four sub-districts of Rangamati Hill District (RHD) in Bangladesh. It intended to do this through increasing the participation and demand for more responsive public services and policies by indigenous (tribal) communities and community based organizations (CBOs), and by increasing the dialogue between the formal and traditional forms of local governance. Its main objectives were to: 1) enhance the capacities of local government leaders, CBOs and tribal community leaders; 2) enable better coordination between stakeholders; and, 3) promote democratic processes to ensure pro-poor service delivery and resource allocation. Its intended outcomes were: empowered CBOs and alternative community leaders; improved participation by traditional community leaders with the formal system; increased women's participation; more pro-poor gender-sensitive local services; greater trust between the different stakeholders (indigenous inhabitants, Bengalis, CBOs and local government); and regular media reporting on RHD governance issues.

This was a two-year USD 275,000 project (1 January 2011 - 31 December 2012). It was implemented by Green Hill, a NonGovernmental Organization (NGO) based in Rangamati, the capital of the Rangamati Hill District. Its main activities were to:

- Engage CBOs and build capacity of alternative community leaders;
- Build the capacity for local government institutions (LGI) and Hill District Council (HDC) officials;
- Increase the coordination and dialogue between CBO, LGI, and HDC leaders on governance problems and solutions;
- Undertake a national and an international study tours; and
- Engage media to increase their coverage on issues related to the project.

(ii) Evaluation Findings

The project objectives were directly **relevant** to the needs of the marginalized tribal communities in the context of the Chittagong Hill Districts. The Peace Accord created a dual governance structure that still required coordination and more responsive systems to indigenous community needs. These communities are marginalized and lacked the understanding needed to participate more effectively. However, the project's approach of creating alternative leaders from CBOs to advocate on their behalf, rather than working directly to engage these communities, and its lack of focus on issues of critical concern to the communities, such as land tenure which is essential to their livelihood and traditional way of life, limited the relevance of the project at the community member level.

Project implementation did not differ significantly from what was foreseen in the project document. Green Hill recruited 17 project staff who then identified four members from each of the 240 CBOs working in the 240 targeted communities to be the community focal points. These persons worked on seven person PROGGATI committees that then implemented the project activities. It also held capacity building and linkage workshops for the local governance institutions and traditional leaders. Using existing networks to establish a project structure was an **effective** way to set up a project structure that could reach down to the grass roots level within a relatively short period of time. This allowed for a quick mobilization of the project despite the dispersed nature of the communities. These committees were able

to link to the local governance officials as many of them had already worked together on other issues. They were able to raise community issues that resulted in some specific solutions for some communities. Most of the training efforts were general in nature and not tailored to the specific groups which limited its effectiveness especially for the traditional authorities which had a more limited frame of reference than the members of the Parishads.

Green Hill was able to **efficiently** establish its project structure. It had experience working with CBOs in the project areas on water and sanitation issues and was able to use those connections to quickly identify its partner CBOs for this effort. The cascade nature of the project structure made it possible for them to reach the grass roots, but the distances (in terms of time to travel) were great, which limited its ability to monitor and mentor activities and linkages at the community levels. The project did not develop synergies with other ongoing projects, several of which were governance related and which could have helped extend its reach and increased its impact. Project reporting was good in terms of regularity, and Green Hill provided more than what was required by the UNDEF grant.

The project met its outputs however the extent of its **impact** is unclear. It did undertake a baseline in Year 1 that provided some descriptive but useful information on the targeted communities. However, this baseline was not repeated so there is no end-of-project data that it could be compared to. Even if such data were available attributing the results of improved governance to this project would have been difficult due to the other projects working in the area and other factors. The project did seem to help resolve small but important issues for the communities, and helped to increase the visibility of the open budget system by promoting its use by its committees. It also seems to have increased the general level of awareness of project participants on governance issues.

The CBO members who served on the PROGGATI committees are still in the communities and can serve as a continuing resource for community members. The committees themselves were not **sustainable** as most participants linked them to the project, rather than to a continuing community institution or system. The efforts to link traditional with local government officials likely left some lasting individual relationships, and these types of exchanges may continue as the project activities set a precedent for them as they this had been rare before

(iii) Conclusions

This was a **worthwhile effort that attempted to address difficult issues in a difficult context**. The project accomplished its intended activities but **its goal was too ambitious for its means and nature of implementation**. The activities stopped at the community committee level rather than going to the grass roots, and the workshops were too intermittent to be able to achieve the anticipated results. Nevertheless, the project **brought the discussion of good governance down to the CBO and traditional leader level which was needed**. Its focus on safety net issues was important, however, more focus on the critical issues of land and indigenous rights as provided for in the Peace Accord, could have made this project more relevant for the communities. There are still issues of peace and integration that remain unresolved which are directly affecting the governance in the region and its ability to respond to the tribal poor.

The project also adopted a one-size-fits all approach to its project efforts, but **the needs and capacities were vastly different between the different stakeholders and participants, and a more tailored program** towards these different actors, and a component to ensure application of the training during their everyday work, **might have yielded better results**

than the general approach taken. There is a continuing need within the hill tribe region for this type of good governance project.

(iv) Recommendations

The efforts to improve good governance in the RHD should continue. For similar projects in the future, the evaluators recommend that Green Hill, and other similar organizations, should ***ensure the inclusion of the community members themselves*** in these types of projects, rather than to continue to focus almost exclusively on the selected leaders. It should also include members of the indigenous political parties which are another governance factor in the area, and include ***focus on the critical issues affecting indigenous communities***. Issues such as the loss of land, forest and fisheries affect their livelihood and way of life and are at the source of the some of the continuing conflict in the region. ***Synergies should also be developed*** with other on-going governance projects in the region to extend project reach and increase its effectiveness.

Future designs should ***factor in the dispersed nature of the communities as well as the ongoing political insecurity*** as this affected project implementation. Possible options include limiting the target area so that it is more manageable, increasing the number of project staff and travel allowances, and bringing local governance officials to the communities for constituency outreach activities. ***Training and other activities should also be focused on the particular needs*** of the different recipients ***and be action-oriented***. Green Hill should ***strengthen its performance monitoring capacity*** by ensuring data is collected at the end of the project as well as at its start. This should include quantitative data (such as perception surveys) as well as the qualitative information collected.

II. Introduction and development context

(i) **The project and evaluation objectives**

The *Promoting Good Governance among Tribal Inhabitants of Bangladesh (PROGGATI)* project was a two-year USD 275,000 project implemented by Green Hill. USD 25,000 of this was retained by UNDEF for monitoring and evaluation purposes. Green Hill also provided USD 9,978 in co-funding. The project ran from 1 January 2011 to 31 December 2012. Its main objectives were to: 1) enhance the capacities of local government officials and tribal leaders; 2) enable better coordination among these different leaders and with stakeholders; and, 3) promote democratic processes for more responsive governance. With these, it intended to build networks and trust among the different stakeholders and forms of government in the Rangamati Hill District, and increase the demand for and delivery of more pro-poor, gender sensitive services for tribal communities in its four targeted sub-districts.

The evaluation of this project is part of the larger evaluation of the Round 2 and 3 UNDEF-funded projects. Its purpose is to “contribute towards a better understanding of what constitutes a successful project which will in turn help UNDEF to develop future project strategies. Evaluations are also to assist stakeholders to determine whether projects have been implemented in accordance with the project document and whether anticipated project outputs have been achieved”.¹

(ii) **Evaluation methodology**

The evaluation took place in July 2013 with field work done in Rangamati from 16-20 July, 2013. A map of the indigenous groups in the Chittagong Hill Tract (CHT) is provided in Annex 1. The evaluation was conducted by Sue Nelson and Md. Ayub Ali, experts in democratic governance. The UNDEF evaluations are more qualitative in nature and follow a standard set of evaluation questions that focus on the project’s relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact, sustainability and any value added from UNDEF-funding (Annex 2). This report follows that structure. The evaluators reviewed available documentation on the project and on the issue of governance and participation in the CHT region where Rangamati is located (Annex 3).

Because of the security situation in the CHT, which requires a special permit for foreigners, and the disruptions caused by national strikes related to Bangladeshi political and electoral processes, the field work in Rangamati was done by the national expert, with the international expert conducting virtual interviews with those outside of the RHD. In Rangamati, the national evaluator met with Green Hill and participants in the project. This included members of the unions (local governance unit), media, traditional leaders, executives of NGOs working in these areas and CBO representatives. He undertook a field visit to three paras/communities to talk to the traditional leaders, community and CBO members. Many of the sub-districts assisted are in remote areas, and the evaluators attempted to reach a sample of participants in those areas by phone. The virtual interviews outside of RHD included the Nepal Participatory Action Network which hosted the international study tour, contractors for the media workshop, UNDP Bangladesh that undertook the milestone report and professors at Chittagong University. The list of persons interviewed is provided in Annex 4.

¹ Operational Manual for the UNDEF-funded project evaluations, p. 6.


During the preparatory work, the evaluators identified several issues which they followed up on during their interviews. These included:

- **Ambitious nature of the project.** The project had very ambitious goals and although it reported delivering most of its outputs, the extent to which it met the attitudinal and governance changes expected in the design was uncertain.
- **Quality of staff and consultant work** as these were the main means to implement the project, and a milestone report done by UNDP raised issues about the quality of their planning and activities.
- **Results and their sustainability** since the project's objectives required changed attitudes and governance practices to be sustainable.

(iii) Development context

Rangamati Hill District is located in the Chittagong Hill Tracts of Bangladesh of the border with India.² Armed conflict began in the CHT in 1977 as tribal groups started to protest against government policies that seemed to favour Bengali settlers in the hill tribe region and that only recognized Bengali culture and language. A Peace Accord was signed on 2 December 1997 which recognizes the rights of the indigenous people in the CHT region. It has yet to be effectively implemented, with many of the underlying causes for the conflict still remaining today. Significant tensions remain, including issues of land. The influx of Bengali migrants has continued and risen from 11 percent of the CHT population in 1974 to around 50 percent today.³

The Peace Accord established a dual system of government in the CHT. It has the national system of government run by the Ministry of Local Government, Rural Development and Cooperation. This oversees a system of elected offices from the Union Parishad, to the Upazila Parishad (sub-district council) which groups several unions, to the district (Zila Parishad) and regional levels. There is also the system run by the Ministry of Chittagong Hill Track Affairs which incorporates the traditional indigenous governance structure of Circles. This includes the Circle Chiefs or Rajas at the top, with Headmen at Mouza (land boundary) level and Karbaries at para/village levels.



This has resulted in a multilayered and dual system of governance institutions. Compounding this complex arrangement are overlapping mandates between institutions and the lack of

² Map from the Rangamati Hill District Council website.

³ DFID, *Bangladesh, Country Governance Analysis*, pps 29-30

clear operational rules and administrative frameworks for most of these institutions. At the local levels where this project worked, the district activities are handled by the Hill District Councils. Each HDC has 30 elected members, the majority of which are supposed to be from the different tribal communities. However, in reality the Bengalis make up the largest ethnic group because 10 seats in each of the three HDCs are reserved for them. Traditional leaders and institutions are also given a special role in governance according to the Peace Accord, and are supposed to be consulted on issues affecting land and revenue administration. These traditional positions are largely hereditary and one of the problems that this project wanted to address was the lack of good representation and accountability to the tribal poor.⁴

The Union and Upazila Parishads oversee the delivery of services by the government departments, and the Headmen and Karbaris are also involved. The UP is the closest local government unit to the hill people. It ensures the delivery of the safety net services, such as vulnerable group development cards and old age allowances.

The project's baseline provided the following characteristics for the local leadership in the Rangamati Hill District:

- *Karbari*, which is a community leader who addresses immediate needs and problems of the village. This role has become less important over time with the emergence of the formal government system. This is usually a male elder and he reports to the Headman.
- *Headman*, is more influential and collects taxes for the Circle Chief or Raja. He will adjudicate social and minor criminal offenses, and maintains close relationships with Upazila and district government offices. The position is hereditary and usually a male.
- *Upazila Parishad Leaders* comprised of the Chairman and Members of the Union Parishad and are the formal local government leadership. They are important for persons on issues related to accessing government services.
- *Upazila Chairman and Vice-Chairman* offices are seen as new and their roles lack clarity in regards to Upazila administration.

The baseline study of the four upzilas targeted in the project area provides a good overview of the indigenous inhabitants. Most are agrarian based or depend on fishing. They have a relatively low literacy rate. This averaged 60 percent in two upzilas, however, in the other two it was only about 31 percent. Women had a much lower rate ranging from 15 percent in one location to 52 percent in another.⁵ The level of participation of the people in local government was said to depend on the type of leadership, and organizational strength of the community. Women's participation was characterized as limited, with the major community decisions taken by men.

There is continuing political conflict within the CHIT region. The Parbatya Chattagram Jan Sanghati Samity (PCJSS) is an indigenous group that fought for the independence of the Chittagong Hill Tracts and later became a political party and signed the Peace Accord with the Government. While this helped to decrease the violence within the region, it provoked fighting between the PCJSS and its splinter group, the United People's Democratic Front (UPDF) and their supporters. UPDF was formed in 1998 by PCJSS dissidents who wanted full autonomy from Bangladesh.⁶ These parties have control over the local inhabitants and the conflict between them sometimes hampered project activities.

⁴ PROGGATI Project Document, p 3

⁵ PROGGA, Baseline Report, p 12

⁶ National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, *Terrorist Organization Profile: Parbatya Chattagram Jana Sanghati Samity (PCJSS)*

III. Project strategy

(i) Project approach and strategy

With this project, Green Hill intended to improve the socio-economic status of poor indigenous persons in four districts in the Rangamati Hill District. It intended to do this through promoting more inclusive, pro-poor gender-sensitive democratic governance. Its primary beneficiaries were the estimated 50,400 poor indigenous community members living in 240 villages.

Green Hill identified several governance problems that were unique to the CHT and its form of parallel governance institutions that it felt hindered the socio-economic development of these marginalized communities. These were: 1) the lack of accountability in the traditional governance system; 2) a lack of harmony and coordination between the traditional and local governance institutions; and, 3) the lack of awareness and capacity of poor indigenous community people to demand more responsive services and to hold their leaders and officials accountable for their delivery.

The project's strategy was to build inclusive pro-poor, gender-sensitive democratic governance by building the capacity of the local government representatives, tribal communities and CBOs to address these communities' needs; enabling better linkages among them, increasing dialogue and coordination among stakeholders, and by promoting the democratic process to ensure pro-poor service delivery and resource allocation.

The approach taken was to:

- Develop alternative leadership among these indigenous communities by Green Hill and other CBOs and to take a more active role in holding the traditional community leadership (TCL) system and other local government officials accountable;
- Build awareness of community members so they are able to hold their traditional and public leaders accountable, participate in local governance, and increase their socioeconomic and human capital;
- Build capacity of governance bodies so they are able to identify ways to work together to foster good governance;
- Improve networking and coordination among these bodies to establish trust, harmony and collective efforts;
- Promote the project's best practices and facilitate replication and scale up through developing an interactive learning system; and,
- Engage media and CSOs as watchdogs to build wider buy-in for objectives of project.

Implementation was to start with identification of the civic participants, starting with those that would be hired by Green Hill as project staff. The intention was for these persons to be recruited from the communities targeted by the project. It then planned to do a mapping of the constraints and opportunities to more responsive governance and to identify the CBOs and media groups to work with the project as democracy watchdogs. Once this core group was established and trained, they then intended to identify and develop almost a thousand community members as agents of change ("*alternative leaders*"). These 960 persons would deliver the community-level capacity building sessions and represent the communities in project activities with their tribal headmen and *Karbairis* (village/para level community leaders). The capacity building sessions (called "courtyard sessions") would focus on issues of good governance, and ways the community members could hold their leaders and officials

accountable for delivering essential services. Each PROGGATI committee would consist of seven members that would hold monthly meetings at the para level.

The project then intended to work on building the capacity of the leaders and officials to develop responsive action plans to the community demands. These action plans would be developed through improving coordination and holding four dialogue sessions among stakeholders (CBOs, TCL and LGI officials) to build trust and improve coordination of the efforts in pro-poor service delivery.

A broad awareness building component was expected to increase understanding and action on these issues. This was to be done through stakeholder advocacy workshop with government ministries, production of locally tailored communication material, and media articles on the positive changes effected by project. It also planned to expose key participants to experiences in other areas, through a national study tour to a Union Parishad of Sylhet district outside of the Hill Tracts and through an international study tour to Nepal.

Gender was addressed in the design by using a 40 percent target for female participation in the project which was assumed would result in more gender-sensitive policy making and action plans.

The main project assumptions were: that the Ministries of Local Government, Rural Development and Cooperation (LGRD) and the Ministry of Chittagong Hill Tract Affairs (CHTA) which managed the traditional government system would be supportive of the project and its objectives; the traditional leaders understood and supported the necessity of establishing alternative leadership-- and especially among women; the district administration and CHT regional councils and hill district councils recognized the governance issues and agreed to establish good governance; and, that the media understood its role in promoting good governance and success stories of the project.

Most of the risks identified were related to these project assumptions. This included: a lack of support by LGRD and CHTA ministries for the project; conflict between the different actors in this dual governance system that might impede improved governance and especially a shift in the balance of power between them; conservative and patriarchal tradition that could hinder empowerment of women; and, inter-ethnic community conflicts between tribal members and Bengalis. The project intended to address these risks through increased communications and awareness which it felt would develop a relationship of trust between the different actors and communities.

(ii) Logical framework

Project activities	Intended outcomes	Medium-term impacts	Long-term development objective
CBOS AND COMMUNITY LEADERS EMPOWERED TO PARTICIPATE IN LOCAL GOVERNANCE			
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Engage CSOs 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CSO mapping done • CSO guidelines developed • 2 key CSOs identified as democracy watchdogs & disseminate information 	Increased awareness of and advocacy for rights of poor tribal communities	Better socio-economic conditions for tribal communities
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Capacity building for potential leaders 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Capacity building manual • 960 potential leaders mobilized in 240 CBOs (40% women) • 5,000 community members reached by mobilizers 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Alternative leadership developed within communities Increased participation of women 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Improved representation for tribal poor Increased accountability of traditional governance
IMPROVED COORDINATION AND BETTER GOVERNANCE BY TRIBAL AND LOCAL OFFICIALS			
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Capacity building for LGI and HDC officials 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Situation assessed • Training manual developed • 5 capacity building workshops • Lessons learned disseminated • Traditional leaders participate in 2 UP action plan meetings/year 	Clearer understanding of roles and responsibilities between TCL, HDC and LGI	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> More inclusive and responsive governance Improved local government service delivery for poor
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Coordination & dialogue between local, CBO, LGI, HDC leaders on governance problems & solutions 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 48 coordination meetings held at union level • 32 linkage workshops • 4 dialogue meetings • 20 monthly LGI coordination meetings at district/UP level 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Good governance mechanism established at UP level between different groups Improved content and delivery of UP action plan More collaborative relationship (LGI and HDC) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Increased trust among stakeholders, local government and CSOs More equitable allocation of resources and support for tribal communities
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • National study tour for CBO, LGI, HDC reps 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Study tour to Sylhet division Bangladesh 	Increased awareness	Improved local government service delivery to poor
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Regional study tour for CBO, LGI, HDC reps 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Study tour in Nepal completed 	Increased awareness	Improved local government service delivery to poor
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • National-level dialogue and advocacy 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 1 conference on CHT and pro-poor democratic governance 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Improved policies for CHT Improved coordination among LGIs and HDC 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Improved government service delivery More equitable, pro-poor, gender sensitive policies
REGULAR MEDIA COVERAGE OF RANGAMATI HILL DISTRICT GOVERNANCE ISSUES			
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Engage media 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Media mapping done • 3 media identified as watchdogs & disseminate information • 4 newspapers, 2 e-media reported project activities 	Increased awareness of governance issues among general public	More transparent and accountable governance

IV. Evaluation findings

(i) Relevance

Overall, the project objectives and expected outcomes were relevant to the needs and priorities of the marginalized indigenous communities in the hill districts. The problems Green Hill had identified in the project design were extremely pertinent given the dual natured formal and traditional governance systems existing in the CHT, the authoritarian nature of traditional leadership, and the poor socio-economic conditions of the tribal groups. Among other things, the indigenous poor lacked access to government facilities, had limited knowledge and awareness of their legal and human rights, and did not know where to go to remedy problems and seek support.

The project assumed however, that it could improve the conditions for the poor tribal communities through increased awareness, capacity building and improved communications. These can certainly contribute to improvements for marginalized groups and for strengthened governance, but the problems in the region are highly complex and the actors themselves are not homogenous within groups. There are still highly charged issues in the CHT of peace and integration into the Bangladeshi system amongst its indigenous populations, some of which have not accepted the 1997 Peace Accord and who still want a separate state. These groups and their factionalism affect the behavior and participation of the tribal communities in civic and political life. This element disrupted the ability of the project to implement activities and needed to be factored into the design.



International Women's Day Observation

In this case, the strategy to overcome risk by increasing communications, raising awareness and building trust was not sufficient to overcome these separatist sentiments and partisan differences. This was evident in reporting that noted the disruption in project activities because of political insecurity, in some cases suspending actions within communities for substantial periods of time. It was also visible during the evaluation, where PROGATTI committee members in a community visited felt compelled to attend an activity arranged by one of the indigenous political parties, regardless of their party preferences, rather than to meet with the evaluator to discuss the project as scheduled.

In addition, many hill tribe communities see the continuing influx of Bengali migrants and outside economic interests into the area as threatening their way of life. This raises for them essential issues land use, communal rights, fisheries and natural resource conservation which are the basis for their livelihood. Although the project focused on social welfare (safety-net) issues, which are important for marginalized communities, the lack of inclusion of these critical issues for the communities reduced the relevance of the project for these tribal communities.

The design objectives also appeared overly ambitious for the approach and planned activity

level. For example, it included improving the administrative and financial management of the HDC which would have involved changing the policies and rules of a government institution. It also selected a model whereby it would reach its 50,000 targeted villagers by developing alternative leaders within 240 communities through the CBOs working there. Their selection was relevant as it ensured they were from the community and knew its people and issues. But the approach of developing them as alternative leaders to serve on behalf of the village kept this effort more at the CBO level than at the community member level which would have been the logical next step in the strategy. Focusing the efforts on the community members themselves, instead of CBO members already active on community issues, would have better reflected the idea of the more inclusive and participatory democratic practices and values that the project intended to instill within the local governance systems. Interviews with community and committee members also indicated that most of the activities stopped at that committee level, and efforts with the wider community were infrequent and primarily limited to community gatherings for commemorative days, such as international women's day.

It should be noted however, that the strategy of developing alternative leadership was endorsed by the project's baseline assessment. It recommended that "*facilitating emergence of alternative leaders as planned in the project is indeed required for ensuring the rights of the local people and their greater access to services from government and other entities.*"⁷ However, as noted in the next section, this approach proved not to be as effective as anticipated during implementation.

(ii) Effectiveness

The project was implemented largely as outlined in the project document. Some of these activities proved to be more effective than others, in particular the linkages between the community committees and elected representatives of UP which resulted in some improvements, such as funding to repair a school roof or its access road in a few cases. However, the overall effectiveness of the project was adversely affected by a number of factors, including its approach, the limited nature of activities, and the CHT political context.

Green Hill did put the main structures for the project into place, and these were used throughout the project to deliver the planned activities. It contracted and trained 17 full time staff to manage these activities in the four upazilas and eight unions of Rangamati District. In evaluation interviews, the project staff seemed motivated and dedicated to the purposes of the project. They had received training on project management and seemed well aware of the process for implementing the project. However, they could have benefited from more training on rights-based issues and other governance issues. They recruited the four volunteer members from each of the 240 CBOs working throughout the region on various development projects and issues. These 960 persons served as the "alternative leaders" for the project and worked primarily through the creation of seven person community-level committees.

Using members of these existing CBOs as focal points for the project was an effective way to set up a project structure at the grass roots level. They had experience in development activities, were part of the targeted communities and had existing linkages with other CBOs, traditional leaders and union level officials that they could use for the benefit of the project. Many of these already knew Green Hill, and had worked with it in a similar manner on water and sanitation programs since 2005.

The use of CBO networks allowed for a quick mobilization of this project and the identification of the almost 1,000 focal points dispersed in small communities throughout the

⁷ PROGGA, *Report on the Baseline Survey of the PROGGATI Project in Rangamati*, p 24

region. This gave the project exceptional reach within months of start up. However, as these CBOs had not worked on governance issues, this made the training aspects of the project especially important. Green Hill provided a one-time training for each of these alternative leaders, with a refresher training in Year 2. This covered topics such as the roles and responsibilities of the LGI and HDC officials, human rights, advocacy, leadership and conflict mitigation. How effective these trainings were is not certain. These are big concepts to understand, internalize and be useful from a three day workshop. The ability of the 17 project staff to then follow up with these 960 persons on the content of the courses and its application to the project activities was limited by the number of committees and their scattered nature over a wide area with rough terrain.

The existing linkages between many of the members of the PROGGATI committees and Union Parishad officials increased access and receptivity for the PROGGATI committees with the Upazila Parishad standing committees. This was especially useful during the open budget process, where, for example, some committees were able to get funding needed to repair their school roof and approach way. The linkages did not extend as much beyond this group and the project's broader advocacy efforts focused more on awareness raising on

service issues than on the type of real advocacy that is needed to effect for policy change.



Participants in refresher training at Baghaicahri Union

Awareness raising was also limited to the attendees at the various workshops. The communities themselves were not fully engaged in this project. Contact was made with them through the committees, but this was infrequent. These meetings did not leave much of an impression. In interviews, only a few of the community level people interviewed were aware of the issues raised by the PROGGATI committees with the LGI.

The project used a one-size fits all curriculum for its workshops and trainings even though the level of education varied widely among the different participants and locations. For example, in Kaptai, the literacy rate was 60 percent while in Juraichhari, it was 37 percent.⁸ The level of education for officials in the formal government system was also at a higher level than most traditional leaders and community members. Yet, the same material was used for each. This was not effective as a significant portion of the traditional leaders interviewed could not recall the content of the project training.

The milestone report on the media workshop, which seems to have been the only training reported on by an external observer, reflects these training issues. This UNDP programme associate, found the content for the workshop relevant to the project outcomes, but that the workshop itself was not pragmatic enough, and he felt that the Dhaka prepared materials did not include the perspectives of local journalists or information on how the CHT structures outlined functioned in reality. The report also raised questions on the selection criteria for the journalists, as only nine local journalists had been invited out of 40. Many of those who had not been invited expressed their unhappiness to the observer, and questioned why these nine journalists were chosen and why more were not included.⁹ The report also noted that it felt that Green Hill could not adequately answer these questions. At this workshop, the CBO

⁸ PROGGA, Baseline Report, p 12
⁹ Milestone Verification Mission Report, p 3

members outnumbered the journalists almost three to one, raising questions as to its purpose. Mixing CBO users and generators of news with the media is a good way to develop linkages between them, but if the purpose had been on training the media, it might have been good to have one workshop primarily for the local journalists and media outlets. This would have allowed the development of a more inclusive media strategy that might have resulted in more media interest in the project and covering of its events. As it was, the project had to contract journalists to cover its stories, but for most the amount was too small (about USD 25) to be worth the effort of traveling to the project locations to cover the story.

Contracting individual journalists was also likely to have been less effective than contracting a newspaper or media outlet. It required a substantial time commitment from the journalist as covering some of the project stories could take up to three days because of the travel time involved. In the interviews, only two of the six journalists contracted seemed to have had this commitment. Even though they did some coverage, it was sporadic, and lacked the investigative type of reporting that can catch the interest of readers, make them more aware of the issues and results in increased public demand for change.

(iii) Efficiency

The project’s implementing structures were efficiently established because of Green Hill’s existing relationship with many of these CBOs. About a quarter of the 240 CBOs had family members working in Green Hill’s water and sanitation CBOs.¹⁰ The existing links between these CBO members and local officials, many of which worked on other projects together besides Green Hill’s, also facilitated project start-up and implementation. As noted in Figure 1, the first workshops with the elected representatives were held within 10 weeks of project signing.


The cascade nature of the project structure should have made project management and monitoring easier, however, the number of CBOs and distances of some of the villages, made this difficult for the number of project staff hired. Although some villages were only 10 - 20 kilometres (km) from the unions, others were 80 - 120 kms away.¹¹ Some were accessible only by boat or motorcycle. This made it difficult for the staff to adequately provide the level of programmatic guidance and monitoring of efforts that were needed to ensure project activities were undertaken as planned in all of these communities.



¹⁰ PROGGA, Baseline study, p 7
¹¹ PROGGA, Op Cit. p 8

This pyramid structure also facilitated the identification of the alternative leaders. However, capacity building for them was not done until Year 2. This is very late in a two-year project and limited the more effective and efficient use of this level of project participants, especially since they were the ones with the direct linkages to the 240 communities that the project intended to assist.

Most of the project budget went for the staff and meetings and training (Figure 2). Although the design intended that most of the project activities were to be done through the bringing of these different groups together in meetings, this left only one percent of the budget for



project activities beyond these meetings and workshops. As the community members were not included in almost all of these activities, this meant that almost the entire budget was devoted to

training and meetings of the leadership of the three main participating groups (CBOs, traditional and formal officials).

This is not an efficient use of the financial resources or the cascading nature of the project structure that could have reached and included these community members directly. According to the project document budget, only 15 persons were budgeted for in the courtyard meetings with the communities. Assuming the committee of seven attended, this meant the reach of these 240 structures was only eight community members each. The expenditures for project equipment was more than four times this amount (4.52 percent). This included the purchase of 3 motorcycles and a boat to reach remote locations, and five computers for project management staff use in the head office “only”.¹² This seems high in terms of a small project. This increased the assets of Green Hill if the computers were only for office use rather than having been used in support of the activities in the field which was supposed to be the bulk of the project activities.

The project also did not seem to leverage other ongoing projects in the area with similar goals and objectives. In particular, with the large UNDP managed project in the CHT: *Promotion of Development and Confidence Building in the Chittagong Hill Tracts*.¹³ This USD 160 million project was on-going during the life of the UNDEF-funded project and covered the Rangamati Hill District and the 8 unions targeted by PROGGATI. Among other things it worked with the Hill District Councils to achieve Millennium Development Goals, and through the creation of community development committees to improve local development, planning and service delivery. The UNDP and Green Hill efforts were complementary, especially with PROGGATI’s focus of improving the links between the traditional authorities and formal government system. In addition, there was a large World Bank funded project, and at least five other NGOs working in the same areas on different issues that this project could have coordinated with to extend its reach and potential impact.

The efficient use of training resources was limited by the general nature of the trainings

¹² UNDEF, UDF-BGD-09-318 Project Document Budget
¹³ UNDP, *Chittagong Hill Tract Development Facility website*.

“raise awareness” or “build capacity”) and the lack of a clear focus on what the participants would do with that information once they got it to improve their ability to do their work and improve the governance in their communities or district. This was noted for the media workshop, but also extended to the other trainings, including the study tours. For those tours, the project got a good cross-section of persons that mixed formal and traditional leaders with PROGATTI committee or CBO members, which is useful for relationship building. But it did not continue this through to the issue of applying what they had learned once they returned home. For example, in the wrap up meetings, the participants noted items that they had learned and felt would be useful in Rangamati, but there was no follow-up after their return to support the implementation of these new ideas. Nothing seemed to have been done after their return, and some of the participants interviewed during the evaluation could not recall at this point what the objective had been for the tour.

Project reporting in terms of regularity was good. Green Hill provided more than was required by the UNDEF grant. In addition to the required mid-term and final reporting it provided quarterly reports, activity reports of major activities such as the study tours, financial reporting (by the large line items) and copies of press coverage, photographs of project activities and copies of all of the products produced by the project including the baseline assessment.

Green Hill administrative systems were cumbersome according to the journalists interviewed. They noted the amount of time and effort it took for them to get their stipends for stories. Some said they were still not paid. Some of this apparently relates to the system which journalists thought was too time consuming (payment by check which required an invoice, returning later to collect a check, and then to a bank to cash the check) and which they felt could have been covered by petty cash since the amounts were small. Otherwise, the evaluators did not hear of other administrative issues related to this project.

(iv) Impact

The project intended to enhance the capacities of local government representatives, CBOs and tribal community leaders; improve stakeholder coordination; and, promote democratic processes to ensure pro-poor service delivery and fair resource allocation. These were ambitious outcomes for a two year project and were too ambitious for its means and for the way the project was implemented. The project was able to make some improvements in some of the specific cases raised by the committees, and in raising the awareness of some of the participants, but impact beyond that is uncertain.

The project undertook a baseline in late 2011. Although it is short and general, and more qualitative in nature than quantitative, it does provide an overview of the situation in the region. This was done through a contract with an NGO in Dhaka, PROGGA Knowledge to Progress, that specializes in research and capacity development. Although the baseline includes a disclaimer that it was only able to cover 8 of the 240 communities due to time, means and their dispersed nature, it does provide a snap shot of these communities and includes descriptions of their socio-economic and literacy status, access to services, and levels of participation in traditional and formal governance. However, no similar survey was done at the end of the project so there is no data available with which to compare and to see if there were any differences.

The project used a combination of output and outcome indicators in its design to measure its results, but project reporting only included data on the output indicators. For example, the project reported that almost 48 percent of its 1,822 participating CBO members were women, but not on whether these women were more empowered or able to *influence annual*

allocations of safety net programmes for extremely poor women by 30%. Another of these indicators was “tribal people report they have received improved access to local government safety net services”. These would have required specific data collection in the baseline and an end-of-project survey to know if these were met.

Even if the project had reported on these indicators, attributing results to PROGGATI would have been difficult. It had limited reach at the community member level and there were a significant number of other on-going projects in the area. In addition to the UNDP CHT development programme mentioned earlier, the World Bank was supporting a *Local Government Support Program (LGSP)* in the unions. Among other activities, it had a capacity building program including training of LGI representatives, and promoted the use of the open budget system.

However, from information provided in the project reports and from the anecdotal information provided in interviews, it is likely that this project resulted in:

- **Small but important community issues being resolved** through raising them in the PROGGATI committees and their interactions with the LGI and UPs. As an example, committee members raised the issue of a leaky school roof in one of the open budget meetings, and obtained funds for its repair. In another, they raised the frequent absence of the paramedics at the community health clinic. This was taken up by the appropriate authorities who ensured the presence of the paramedics at this clinic which improved the access to health services for this community.
- **Increased use of the open budget system** which was created by the Municipality Act (2009). This Act required mandatory quarterly ward level meetings and open budget meetings. This was the process used in the examples noted above. Seven of the eight union level committees participated in their union’s open budget meetings which set a good precedent for future community participation.

- **Increased awareness by some LGI leadership on important issues.** At the start of the project, the LGI representatives reportedly knew some of the contents of the Chittagong Hill Tracts Regulation 1900 which used to provide the basis for the administration of the CHT. However, they were not as aware of the newer regulations and concepts of democratic governance that underlie these acts, such as human rights, and the rights of women and children. However, the training and workshops widened the space to discuss these issues, and for them to better understand their own roles and responsibilities. However, effective coordination and cooperation between the HDC and LGIs did not appear to be established. The linking of these two institutions seemed to be limited to attending some common meetings arranged by the project. At the same time, the project seemed to have contributed to **strengthening the relationships between the CBO members and the LGIs** because of the more regular meetings.



UP Chairman addressing annual plan and open budget at Advocacy meeting Rangamati

- **Increased awareness among participants on governance issues and rights** because of the workshops and discussions. This increase in awareness however, did not seem to extend to an increased demand for these rights. There was one case reported for the Shilchara community, where the chair of the PROGGATI community won a fight against a big industrialist to recover community land. But this person had started the effort before this project and was a government employee. However, at the same time, it is likely that the project structures and linkages helped him to win his case.

(v) Sustainability

The project's approach of using members of CBOs working in the community is likely to contribute to the sustainability of some of the efforts undertaken by the project, as these are the same people who will continue to work on other projects within the community. They are still there and available for community members as focal points.

The committees created by the project no longer met after the end of the project. A few of them reported that they had arranged for meetings once or twice but participation was too poor to continue. They felt the attitude was that the project was over, so why would the committees continue to meet. At the same time, they said they would continue to participate if the project was extended.



There are likely some lasting relationships built between the local government officials and the traditional leaders. The project workshops created the scope for them to meet and interact, which was rare in the pre-project period.

V. Conclusions

Based on the evaluation findings, the team concludes:

(i) The project achieved its outputs, but its goals were too ambitious for the nature of the activities undertaken. Project structures were established that could have ensured adequate reach, but the substance and outreach of its activities needed to be scaled up considerably for the project strategy to have worked within this very complex governance environment. This conclusion follows from findings (i), (ii), (iii), (iv) and (v).

(ii) Project activities primarily engaged those already active in community affairs and reach beyond them was limited. The project mainly gave CBO members the means to continue their efforts and discussions with local officials, and did not appear to extend much beyond them to the wider community. This limited its relevance and impact to the average community member, and to a lesser extent, the traditional leadership structures. This conclusion follows from findings (i), (ii), (iv),

(iii) Despite its limitations, the project started actions towards enhancing the democratization process in the RHD which was needed. The content and duration of the activities were too limited to achieve more than the initial steps towards building a constructive working relationship between the different actors and stakeholders. However, it has created scope for this type of interaction. This conclusion follows from findings (i), (ii), (iv) and (v).

(iv) More focus on the critical governance issues for local communities, such as their land rights, would have increased PROGGATI's relevance to the local communities and issues of democratic governance, such as protection of indigenous rights, respect for the implementation of the Peace Accord and more responsive public policies, which would have also helped to contribute more strategically to the overall outcome sought by the project. This conclusion follows from findings (i), (ii), (iv) and (v).

(v) PROGGATI efforts lacked synergies with other relevant projects in the area that could have increased its reach and effectiveness. In particular, linkages with the UNDP and World Bank efforts could have provided additional forums for the advocacy efforts of the project, extended its reach beyond its main participants and reinforced its awareness building efforts. This conclusion follows from findings (ii), (iii), (iv) and (v).

(vi) Capacity building and awareness raising efforts were useful to expand participants' knowledge, but should have been more pragmatic and linked more directly to the subsequent actions expected of the participants. Having a clearer purpose for the workshops and trainings related to project activities would have increased their effectiveness and been more useful for participants and the achievement of project objectives. This conclusion follows from findings (ii), (iii), (iv) and (v).

(vii) Frames of reference and educational levels between traditional leaders and government leaders were too different to use one curriculum for all. The curriculum needed to be adapted for the different levels and needs of the participants to be more relevant and effective. This conclusion follows from findings (i), (ii) and (iv).

(viii) The project left a small footprint. Despite the large geographic area it covered it was hard to see the effect of the project six months after its end. This is likely because the main project participants were working before and after this project on these types of issues with other projects, so differentiating between efforts is difficult. This conclusion follows from findings (ii), (iv) and (v).

(ix) The project might have made a more substantive impact than was visible to the evaluators, **but it is not possible to know without end-of-project data to compare against the baseline.** Even then, attributing results to this project would be difficult given the other activities in the area and the pre-project relationships between community leaders and local government officials. This conclusion follows findings (i), (ii), (iii) and (iv).

(x) There is a continuing need to address problems of governance in the CHT, especially to find a way forward for traditional communities who feel the Peace Accord is not being implemented as promised. This conclusion follows from finding (ii), (iv) and (v).

VI. Recommendations

To strengthen similar projects in the future, the team recommends:

(i) Project strategy should include an active participation role by community members rather than maintaining an almost exclusive focus on selected leaders. This could help increase the awareness of the community members on their rights, and enable them to raise problems that affected their communities directly with their traditional leaders, and formal government structures. This recommendation follows conclusions (ii), (viii) and (x).

(ii) More direct targeting of the traditional leaders and adapting training materials to their level and use. This could help them better understand their role and linkages with the formal system as well as their accountability aspects towards their community members. This would provide them with a more even footing with the formal officials in any linkage workshops or efforts. This recommendation follows conclusions (iii), (vi), (vii), (viii), and (x).

(iii) Inclusion of the critical issues affecting indigenous communities, such as land, forest and fisheries. Safety net issues are important, but the indigenous communities are divided over integration and fear losing their livelihood and land. These are critical issue for them and the maintenance of peace in the region. Advocacy efforts could focus on issues of land, forest and fisheries as well as safety net. This recommendation follows from conclusions (i), (iii), (iv), (v), (viii) and (x).

(iv) More focus on outreach by the elected officials (union and upazila) with the community constituencies. The project could arrange for the visit of these officials to the communities to discuss specific issues of community concern and to build the links between the elected officials and their constituents. This would help develop the linkages sought by the project and bring it down to the level of the constituents themselves rather than through interface of traditional or alternative leaders. This recommendation follows from conclusions (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (vi), (viii), and (x).

(v) Develop synergies with other governance efforts in the Rangamati Hill District, including those focusing on democratization, peacebuilding, civic education and women's participation. This would maximize the use of resources, extend project reach and strengthen its efforts. This recommendation follows from conclusions (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (viii), and (x).

(vi) Future projects should be more realistic in scope for their means, so the project can focus its efforts and achieve the desired outcomes, and the **strategy should more adequately address the remoteness of some villages** so they are able to be more adequately integrated into project activities and monitored by project staff. This could be limiting the target area so that it is more manageable, choosing locations that are closer to each other, increasing the number of project staff and travel allowances, and/or bringing officials to their locations for community forums and outreach as recommended in (iv) above. This recommendation follows from conclusions (i), (ii), (vi) and (viii).

(vii) Continue efforts to address problems of governance in the RHD, especially to find a way forward for traditional communities and those who feel the Peace

Accord is not being implemented as promised. The more inclusive efforts that could bring the community members themselves as well as the indigenous political party leadership in those communities would be more effective in this context. This recommendation follows from conclusions ((i), (ii), (iv), (viii) and (x).

(viii) Green Hill should strengthen its performance monitoring capacity by continuing the use of a baseline survey at the end of the project as well as the start, and adopt indicators that could more accurately and easily measure its project performance. A short knowledge, attitude and practice (KAP) survey could be done before and after project to measure changes in these areas. This recommendation follows conclusions (viii) and (ix).

VII. Overall assessment and closing thoughts

This was a worthwhile effort but required clarity of purpose to be more effective at addressing some of the extremely difficult challenges facing the indigenous population within the Rangamati Hill District.

The PROGGATI project design targeted a very critical need in the Chittagong Hill Tracts region-- the integration of the indigenous people and their traditional governance system into the formal governance system of Bangladesh. More than a decade after the Peace Accord, this remains an issue and source of conflict and marginalization. At the same time, the grantee, as a water and sanitation focused NGO, attempted to do this through focusing on improving safety net problems for the communities. Although using social welfare issues as a means to generate discussion and improve service delivery can be used effectively to improve local governance, this is not an activity that will improve complex governance systems and relationships within a still unstable post-conflict environment by itself.

The mixing of these two objectives, and the lack of a clear project purpose for either improving the relationships between different forms of governance or for improved service delivery, resulted in the generalized nature of the project activities and content of its curriculum. This might have increased awareness on some issue or resulted in the allocation of funding for a particular community need, but it lacked the focus and attention needed to either change the social welfare system for these communities or improve the relationships between the dual nature of the governance system and the critical governance issues facing these traditional communities.


VIII. Limitations, constraints and caveats

This evaluation was constrained by the security situation within the Chittagong Hill Tracts area and the nationwide strikes that occurred in Bangladesh during the evaluation. This necessitated the field work in the Rangamati Hill District to be done by the national expert, with the international expert working virtually. It also restricted the number of officials and participants that the national expert could meet, as strikes occurred during the field work. The field work was also constrained by the remote nature of some of the villages assisted, some of which can take a day to access by boat or motorcycle. The team attempted to compensate for this by calling participants in some of the outlying communities, but most of these persons would not answer their phones as they did not recognize the number of the person calling them.

Nevertheless, the team believes that it was able to get a good overview of the project, its accomplishments and challenges from the time spent in the region, the virtual interviews, and through the review of the project reporting, which is more comprehensive than most UNDEF-grantees and which documented the main project activities.

VIII. ANNEXES

Annex 1. Map of Ethnic Groups Chittagong Hill District



Source: Md. Mashiur Rahman, *Struggling Against Exclusion, Adibasi in Chittagong Hill Tracts, Bangladesh*, p 36

Annex 2: Evaluation questions

DAC criterion	Evaluation Question	Related sub-questions
Relevance	To what extent was the project, as designed and implemented, suited to context and needs at the beneficiary, local, and national levels?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Were the objectives of the project in line with the needs and priorities for democratic development, given the context? ▪ Should another project strategy have been preferred rather than the one implemented to better reflect those needs, priorities, and context? Why? ▪ Were risks appropriately identified by the projects? How appropriate are/were the strategies developed to deal with identified risks? Was the project overly risk-averse?
Effectiveness	To what extent was the project, as implemented, able to achieve objectives and goals?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ To what extent have the project's objectives been reached? ▪ To what extent was the project implemented as envisaged by the project document? If not, why not? ▪ Were the project activities adequate to make progress towards the project objectives? ▪ What has the project achieved? Where it failed to meet the outputs identified in the project document, why was this?
Efficiency	To what extent was there a reasonable relationship between resources expended and project impacts?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Was there a reasonable relationship between project inputs and project outputs? • Did institutional arrangements promote cost-effectiveness and accountability? • Was the budget designed, and then implemented, in a way that enabled the project to meet its objectives?
Impact	To what extent has the project put in place processes and procedures supporting the role of civil society in contributing to democratization, or to direct promotion of democracy?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • To what extent has/have the realization of the project objective(s) and project outcomes had an impact on the specific problem the project aimed to address? • Have the targeted beneficiaries experienced tangible impacts? Which were positive; which were negative? • To what extent has the project caused changes and effects, positive and negative, foreseen and unforeseen, on democratization? • Is the project likely to have a catalytic effect? How? Why? Examples?
Sustainability	To what extent has the project, as designed and implemented, created what is likely to be a continuing impetus towards democratic development?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ To what extent has the project established processes and systems that are likely to support continued impact? ▪ Are the involved parties willing and able to continue the project activities on their own (where applicable)?
UNDEF value added	To what extent was UNDEF able to take advantage of its unique position and comparative advantage to achieve results that could not have been achieved had support come from other donors?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • What was UNDEF able to accomplish, through the project, that could not as well have been achieved by alternative projects, other donors, or other stakeholders (Government, NGOs, etc). • Did project design and implementing modalities exploit UNDEF's comparative advantage in the form of an explicit mandate to focus on democratization issues?

Annex 3: Documents Reviewed

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Rangamati Hill District Council, <http://rhdcbd.org/index.php>

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<http://www.somashte.org/>

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Annex 4: Persons Interviewed

On Site Interviews	
16 July 2013	
Arrival National Consultant	
Lal Chhuak Liana Pangkhua	PROGGATI Project Manager
Martanda Protap Chakma.	PROGGATI Union Project Officer
Richo Khisa	PROGGATI Monitoring Officer
Tulu Chakma	PROGGATI Union Project Officer
Umong Marma	PROGGATI Union Project Officer
Kushal Chakma	PROGGATI Upazila Project Officer
Mimi Dewan (Ms)	PROGGATI Union Project Officer
17 July 2013	
Biplob Chakma	Executive Director ASHIKA (local NGO)
Manabashish Chakma	Coordinator, Taungya, (local NGO)
Bijoy Giri Chakma	Chairman, Balukhali Union, Rangamati Sadar
Prokash Talukder	Secretary, Rangamati Sadar Union, Rangamati
Monickhyo Chakma	Member, 7 No. Ward, Rangamati Sadar Union, Rangamati
Biplob Tripura	UP member, 2 No. Ward Rangamati Sadar Union, Rangamati
Mr. Satrong Chakma	Staff Reporter, Rangamati, Daily Somokal (a national daily newspaper)
18 July 2013	
Mr. Monotosh Chakma	Administrative Officer, Rangamti Hill District Council
Sanjira Chakma	Karbari, Shapchari Modhaya Para
Anjan Chakma	Treasurer, Shapchari Modhaya PROGGATI Committee
Shubash Chakma	Member, Shapchari Modhaya PROGGATI Committee
Jharna Chakma	Member, Shapchari Modhaya PROGGATI Committee
Mohammad Ali	Executive Director, Shinning Hill (local NGO)
Anwar A. Haque	Editor, The Daily Rangamati (local newspaper)
Shakhawat Hossain Rubel	Rangamati Correspondent, The Daily Purbokon
19 July 2013	
Arun Talukdar	Headman, Wagga Mouza, Kaptai
Mahbubul Alam	Member, Wagga Union Parishad, Kaptai
Apai Marma	Member, Wagga Union Parishad, Kaptai
Ume Ching Marma (Ms)	Former UP members and President PROGGATI Committee
Aung Thawai Marma	Chairman, Noapara PROGGATI Committee and BRDP employee
Minu Prue Marma (Ms)	Member, Union Parishad and member Valwapara PROGGATI Committee
Uttom Marma	Karbari and President Valwapara PROGGATI Committee

UChi Mong Chowdhury	Project Officer, UNDP
Tapan Marma	Member PROGGATI Committee, Schilchari Marma para, Wagga, Kaptai
Virtual Interviews	
Mayananda Dewan	Headman, Juraichari
Md. Abdul Alim	Director Elections, The Asia Foundation, formerly with UNDP
Saima Anwer	Deputy Director, The Asia Foundation
Md. Monzurul Islam Kamal	UNDP Programme Associate, UNDP
Mir Masruruzzaman	News Editor, Channel I, Director SoMaSHTE, Consultant for PROGGATI Media Strategy
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Annex 4 : Acronyms

CBO	Community Based Organization
CHT	Chittagong Hill Tracts
MoCHTA	Ministry of Chittagong Hill Tract Affairs
HDC	Hill District Council
KAP	Knowledge, Attitude and Practices Survey
KM	Kilometer
LGI	Local Government Institutions
LGRD	Ministry of Local Government, Rural Development and Cooperation
LGSP	Local Government Support Program (World Bank)
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
PCJSS	Parbatya Chattagram Jana Sanghati Samity
PROGGATI	Promoting Good Governance among Tribal Inhabitants in Bangladesh
RHD	Rangamati Hill District
TCL	Traditional Community Leader
UNDEF	United Nations Democracy Fund
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UO	Union Parishad officials
UP	Upazila Parishad
UPDF	United People's Democratic Front
USD	U.S. Dollar