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**EVALUATION REPORT**



**UDF-MYA-09-327 - Civic Education and Civil Society Empowerment  
in remote areas (Myanmar)**

**Date: 28 November 2013**

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**Disclaimer**

The views expressed in this report are those of the evaluators. They do not represent those of UNDEF or of any of the institutions referred to in the report.

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## I. Executive Summary

### (i) Project Data

The project ran from January 1<sup>st</sup>, 2011 to December 31<sup>st</sup> 2012 with a total grant of 250,000 USD. And was implemented by Myanmar Egress (ME). ME is a lead civil society organization; established in Myanmar in 2006 at the initiative of seven founding members who put together their network of influence to cut across the divides of Myanmar social, political and economic scene. The project general objective was to support the development of good governance in Myanmar through the development of civil society, civic education and advocacy skills. Activities set to advance towards this objective were three fold:

1. Develop Civic Education Trainings and organize Township Level Meetings to support the development of good governance through CSOs.
2. Organize Core Leader Meeting and Policy Paper Writing Process to strengthen policy advocacy in civil society network and develop white policy papers.
3. Create a website for civil society policy advocacy practices and exchanges of experience among Egress alumni students.

The training quantitative objectives were the following:

- Provide 48 three-day training in 14 States/Regions within two years with the aim to “civically educate” 2880 individuals;
- Organize 48 townships level meetings back to back during the three days of training;
- Organize 4 Core Leaders Meetings of 40 participants each “playing a steering role in the project” and setting Policy Advocacy (Basic) Units in 14 states/regions to produce 14 White Papers;
- Ensure the “Policy Watch” website focuses on policy issuers and encompasses the 14 Federal States.

The project is embedded into a broader and more comprehensive training program designed by Myanmar Egress to create large groups of trained people able to disseminate knowledge and experience throughout the country. Other sections of the training program are supported by a variety of donors (EU, DfID and SIDA).

### (ii) Evaluations findings

#### Relevance

The project is very relevant in the particular context of the country opening. First, because there is an array of expectation and knowledge that cut across the entire Myanmar society which can be partly matched by the content of the training program; second, the training program takes place in all the 14 states of Union of Myanmar and it is the first one of its kind of being able to have such a wide coverage; and third and lastly, because it fits into the global approach of institutionalized regionalism that is part of the global agreement between the government and ethnic groups.

#### Effectiveness

All quantifiable targets have been reached or outpaced. The training and the township level forums attracted 2938 participants in all the states of the Union against a projection of 2880 participants in 48, 4 days sessions. The four Core Leader Meetings were held in sequences as planned and the provision of 14 white/policy papers was delivered. The website has been launched too.

However, although the training program has attracted a large number of participants, participation was rather dictated by informal networks and affinities than by a willingness to

target specific individual. No specific profiles had been defined by ME at the time of project design. However the typical profile of a participant was male (60%), unemployed (63%), primary or secondary school level (59%) and member of a CSO (82%).

The participants interviewed speak highly of the training although some improvements can be factored easily. The situation is significantly different for the township level forum who took place back to back with the training: it did not reach the objective of soliciting initiatives and brainstorming on regional/local issues. Likewise although the Core leader meetings were held as planned significant weaknesses were identified in the preparation of the policy papers side: unawareness at local level and even from the drafters of the whereabouts of the papers; absence of clear and focused dissemination policy lead to assume that there was a clear issue with the policy papers quality. Finally, the website has not been used as an effective tool for knowledge and information by any of the participants interviewed and the meeting between the team and ME did not demonstrate the usefulness of the website within the project remit.

### **Efficiency**

The project has been implemented efficiently; The value for money is gauged as excellent with only 23,5% allocated to managerial operations and a ratio of 64% of the costs allocated to the training program and the township level forum and a cost per trainee of 50 \$US for a four day session. In addition, the project implementation team overcame successfully significant bureaucratic and logistical obstacles such as requests for government permissions to conduct training in remote areas, but also, once granted, to face the operating conditions existing there (i.e. poor training facilities, health risks, and spotty telecommunications).

### **Impact**

Although there was not enough systematic follow-up of the trainees many of the interviewees did mention that the training did increase their confidence, brought changes in their lives and increased their social skills. The UNDEF funded training was also a significant vehicle for bringing people into other ME training program. The impact of the township level meeting and of the policy papers are, on the other hand, a lot more questionable and significant qualitative improvements should and could be factored.

### **Sustainability**

There appears to be a great deal of positive "knock-on effects" (i.e. participants starting up a training school or CSO, or in political office); however, assessing the relative worth of these effects would be a highly subjective exercise. The global approach developed by the organization makes even more important the UNDEF funded training. It can be seen at the point of entry into ME training process and as an induction training aiming at identifying high potential individual that will be able to be involved into ME secondary and tertiary level training. However, the participation to secondary or tertiary training is subject to individuals capacities to make themselves available over a long period of time (up to three months). This represents a constraint which is largely not feasible for many ordinary middle age individual actors that should make the largest group of structured civil society activist.

### **UNDEF Added Value**

Without the funding provided by UNDEF, it is unlikely that ME would have been able to undertake such a country wide induction training and impart training to audiences, which have largely be forgotten by the donor community or were not able to be reached mainly for political reasons. In addition UNDEF funding is highly regarded by ME management and preferred from other sources on ground of flexibility and reputation.

### **(iii) Conclusions**

**i.** The project **supported the decentralization process ongoing in Myanmar**. It built civil society capacity towards regional units in the country's 14 regions. The institutionalized structure put in place by the project built a new mindset of civic participation and engaged the local government in its support and vitalization. This conclusion derives from findings on relevance.

**ii.** **ME's strong relationship with the central government and its established network, highly facilitated the achievement of satisfactory quantitative results** through the delivery of an effective civic education method. This positive assessment is mitigated by the operational improvements that could be brought in case of training replication. This conclusion derives from the findings related to effectiveness.

**iii.** As regard to the project efficiency **it is quite laudable that the project managed to deliver its targeted results within the timeframe set for it, and in spite of the local government lack of responsiveness** and late delivery of circulation authorisations. Considering these constraints, the Value for Money was excellent but the conservatism adopted by ME in its initial costing may have led to tensions with implementers (trainers and management) and participants in operating within the strict parameters of the approved budget.

**iv.** Although Myanmar Egress lacks a systematic means of monitoring alumni activity, alumni stay closely connected via an alumni association. **It is obvious from the individual interviews that the program has made a tangible difference in peoples' lives. Although lines of causality are unclear, many program participants are now more politically active.** The knowledge they have acquired from training allows them to: better educate their respective political parties, start their own training centers and CSOs, work effectively in local government, hold government more accountable as an informed citizens and so on. This conclusion derives from finding on impact.

**v.** **The project has created an initial impetus for political change at the regional level. Participants' perception of government has changed.** They view themselves as rights-holders that can engage the government and hold it accountable to provide quality goods and services in a timely manner. **The project has also created a desire for continued learning. This is evidenced through the training institutes that participants and implementers themselves have created.** In this aspect alone, the project proves its sustainability. The subject material they teach is also likely to become specific to regional concerns and taught in the local language.

**vi.** **UNDEF funding has been instrumental in getting ME's initial/induction training implemented and there is a good fit between the UNDEF funding and ME's management of the activities:** The level of funding that UNDEF has been able to provide is commensurate with the size of the program; UNDEF reporting (financial and technical) is light and matches ME team managerial capacity; UNDEF funding label gives Myanmar Egress a visibility that it uses at its best. Last a brief analysis of the development scene shows that it is very unlikely that any other organizations geared toward assisting civil society would have been able to implement a training program of this scope in all regions/states of Myanmar. It is a distinct comparative advantage of ME that it is able to have this outreach. This conclusion derives from the findings on UNDEF value added.

#### **(iv) Recommendations**

The evaluation would recommend a clear set of workable and qualitative improvements that will bring considerable added value to the implementation of a large training program of this kind.

- ***The course content should be more tailored to local demands and regional issues.*** This would entail a longer training set-up period and related costs, but will bring considerable added value to audiences. This would have a particular value in the perspective of a democratic agenda leading to the 2015 electoral process.

- ***Training approach should contain fewer monologues and more dialogue.*** The training should step away from the traditional lecture-based teachings style and should make way for more group discussion and consensus building. The training content will gain of being more focused and less general; the number of domain/subject matters should be carefully assessed and on the basis of lessons learnt by trainers, trimmed down to a lesser number. It will gain in depth and in substance and is likely to bring more added value to participants.

- The issue of holding course in ethnic minority language is a difficult one to deal with, but has been cited a number of times; ***our recommendation would be however to continue to use the Burmese language to avoid unnecessarily regionalism*** at a time where the political and economic context is evolving favorably.

- ***Township level forums are key to the overall added value of the training program. They must be a lot more structured, with measurable outputs and linked to continued support to participants.*** It should become the cornerstone of the training program against which it is ultimately gauged. It is there and not through the use of local languages, that differences and sensibilities should be expressed. The momentum built up after four days of training should be turned into action. Participants should articulate their goals and walk away from the forum with both individual and collective action plans. To this end, it is worth considering either to expand the duration of Township level forums to a full day or alternatively to extend the duration of the forum as a whole and give it a more detail, output oriented structure.

- ***The policy papers must be widely disseminated at both the national and regional levels.*** A proper communication strategy must be defined with possibly a considerable increase of the financial resources allocated. It means presenting the papers directly to local government and publishing abstracts in local newspapers. The policy papers should also be printed and distributed widely to CSOs and political parties. It also means that the quality of the papers have been carefully reviewed and vetted by reputable sources so it becomes real benchmarks for policymakers, media and other CSOs in general.

- ***Although an online presence is important for an organization, the website usefulness in the framework of the UNDEF funding must be debated.*** In the event of a new program funded by UNDEF, no funding should be contemplated for a tool which is largely an internal one. The resources allocated to a potential website should be used for other more relevant purposes and for instance the printing and distribution of policy papers.

- ***Budget should be reviewed with additional resources allocated to a single training session.*** It will ease up the constraint on trainers, allow quality material to be disseminated and better logistical conditions for the training session. In the event a new

program is envisaged, it is not suggested to decrease the number of training sessions given the thrust for knowledge and information that cut across the Myanmar society.

- ***A proper tool should be developed to select the participants more accurately and monitor the participants after the completion of the training;*** profile should be better defined in relation to the expected impact and sustainability of the training program.

#### ***Recommendation for UNDEF***

- The project implementation was appropriate and professional. However it should be looked further and in the ***context of the democratic agenda on which Myanmar is firmly engaged and with the 2015 elections at sight***. There it would be important that UNDEF continue to be present in Myanmar. A continuation of the funding should, despite UNDEF guidelines not in favor of financing several times the same activities, not be ruled out. It will require some adjustments that are recommended in the report. In addition UNDEF should not be adverse to other proposals which have a more robust and hands-on approach in dealing with other important issues related to the electoral cycle management.



## II. Introduction and development context

### (i) **The project and evaluation objectives**

The *Civic education and civil society empowerment in remote areas* project was a two-year USD 250,000 project implemented by the Myanmar Egress (ME). USD 25,000 of this was retained by UNDEF for monitoring and evaluation purposes. The project ran from 1 January 2011 to 31 December 2012. Its main objectives were to: (1) provide Civic Education Trainings and Township Level Meetings to support the development of good governance through Civil Society Organizations (CSOs), (2) organize Core Leader Meeting and Policy Paper Writing Process to strengthen policy advocacy in civil society network and develop white policy papers; (3) set up a policy advocacy Civil Society Website aiming at providing all Myanmar Egress alumni a platform for exchange.



**Myanmar Egress office in Yangon, Myanmar**

UNDEF funded training was entirely embedded into a broader and comprehensive training program designed by Myanmar Egress to create large groups of trained people able to disseminate knowledge and experience throughout the country (see section III(i) below).

Myanmar Egress (ME) was created in 2006 at the initiative of seven founding members (Nay Win Maung, Sonny Nyunt Thein, Hla Maung Shwe, Tin Maung Thann, Ye Myat Thu, Kyaw Ni Khin & Kyaw Yin Hlaing) who put together their network across the divides of Myanmar social, political and economic scene. Myanmar Egress is “committed to state building through

positive change in a progressive yet constructive collaboration and working relationship with the government and all interest groups, both local and foreign.”<sup>1</sup>

Over the years, an organization with a significant number of activities has been created; ME is based on three distinct pillars:

- Training program: implemented through CDC (Capacity Development Center), which is the training arm of the organization;
- Policy Advocacy through the management of ME
- Political Engagement: Key members of ME are part of the peace talks with a major armed fraction (the Kachin independence Army or KIA);

The organization has also given birth to a number of affiliated organizations such as NAG (Network/Nargis Activities Group) which works with local communities at grass roots level (local governance issues) and MDR (Myanmar Development Research) which undertakes research for the World Bank and the private sector. The Myanmar Egress Outreach-Alumni Group has, with time, burgeoned and created a network spreading across the country (albeit predominantly in the Burmese majority states).

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<sup>1</sup> [www.myanmaregress.org](http://www.myanmaregress.org)

The evaluation of this project is part of the larger evaluation of the Round 2 and 3 UNDEF-funded projects. Its purpose is to “contribute towards a better understanding of what constitutes a successful project which will in turn help UNDEF to develop future project strategies. Evaluations are also to assist stakeholders to determine whether projects have been implemented in accordance with the project document and whether anticipated project outputs have been achieved.”<sup>2</sup>

### ***(ii) Evaluation Methodology***

The evaluation was conducted by an international expert, working with another international expert based in Yangon. The team worked with the support of a national interpreter/translator during field visits under the terms of the framework agreement between UNDEF and Transtec. In accordance with the agreed process, the evaluation aimed to answer questions addressing the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) criteria of relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact, and sustainability, as well as the additional criterion of UNDEF value added (see Annex I).

The evaluation took place in February and March 2013 with the field work in Myanmar conducted from February 17 to 23. The evaluators reviewed available project documentation and contextual/background materials from the project (Annex 2). Initial and final interviews were held with ME management staff including its President, the Executive Director, the present Program Director and assistant as well as the former program staff. In addition the team met members of the training teams, the webmaster and the project accountant. Field work was based on focus group meetings and exchanges with training organization teams, trainees, and separate face to face meetings with Core Leaders and members who were directly involved in the preparation of white policy papers. The team visited ethnic minorities (Mon and Kayin) in two different states; Mawlamyine and Hpa-an. The team also met a number of other CSOs (Pyoe Pinh, ActionAid, FFI) active in Myanmar with a view to assessing different capacity development approaches as well as other important donors such as the European Union (EU) and the United Kingdom Development Fund (DfiD), both working with CSOs for peace building support operations. It was unfortunately not possible to meet members of the two German foundations involved into other ME programs (Friedrich Eibert Stiftung- FES and Friedrich Naumann Stiftung FNS) for availability reasons. The full list of people interviewed is provided in Annex 3.

### ***(iii) Development context***

Since its origin, Myanmar, formerly Burma, has struggled to define itself as a country and forge national unity. Myanmar is composed of 14 states and divisions in which there are 135 different ethnic groups and 108 ethno-linguistic groups; all recognized by the current Constitution. While the center of the country is predominantly Burmese, the eight states on the periphery are populated by, and named after, the eight largest ethnic minorities. This diverse population spreads across South East Asia’s second largest country in terms of land mass.

Shortly after British colonization ended, the Myanmar Government reached consensus that the states should act as semi-autonomous entities, with the option of leaving the union.<sup>3</sup> Due to successive and violent regime changes, this did not come to pass, and power in government has become highly centralized. In response, the ethnic states have been vying for greater autonomy from the central government for decades, marked by a constant oscillation between ceasefires and open conflict. At the time of writing, there are 11 ceasefire

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<sup>2</sup> Operational Manual for the UNDEF-funded project evaluations, p. 6.

<sup>3</sup> Panglong Agreement [http://www.ibiblio.org/obl/docs/panglong\\_agreement.htm](http://www.ibiblio.org/obl/docs/panglong_agreement.htm)

agreements with armed ethnic groups, while open conflict continues with the KIA in the North of the country<sup>4</sup>.

Centralized military rule and the complete lack of public accountability became defining characteristics of the Myanmar Government under the rule of General Ne Win from 1962 to 1988. After a severe repression of the student revolts in 1988, General Ne Win ceded power and the military created the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) to rule the country. The crackdown on the student revolts as well as repeated human rights violations by the military led to economic sanctions against Myanmar by the Western world. Viewed as an international pariah, the military and its political arm, the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) have remained in power ever since, and the state-owned economy has remained stagnant. Opposition to the government has long been suppressed as evinced by the brutal crackdown of the Saffron Revolution in 2007 and the 19-year house arrest of the opposition party leader, Aung San Suu Kyi.

The Burmese people, and to a greater extent the ethnic minorities, have been marginalized by the government. The electoral process has either been unfair or the results have not been upheld. Politics has been a taboo subject. The government has blacklisted many activists, forcing them to leave the country, or imprisoned them. As a result, the people of Myanmar completely exited the political sphere, and the military regime has been left to its own devices to run the country with no oversight or accountability.

### **2008 and Onwards**

The context in Myanmar however, has changed significantly as of late. Although the 2008 constitution reserved 25% of seats in parliament, it also outlined an 8-step plan towards a democratic government. These steps have been followed to date and the 2010 elections produced a civilian president, Thien Sien. Thein Sien has ushered in a new era of political reforms and opened not only dialogue with opposition parties but also diplomatic relations with the rest of the world. His regime has released thousands of political prisoners and is making progress in peace negotiation and the decentralization process<sup>5</sup>. Government censorship of the media and internet<sup>6</sup> has also been almost entirely removed.

The 2012 bi-elections were a major step towards democracy. Accredited by international observers as free and fair, the bi-elections were a landslide-victory for the opposition party, the National League for Democracy (NLD). The NLD won 43 of the 45 seats in parliament being contested for re-election. The upper and lower houses of the parliament are composed of 664 seats, so the elections did not dramatically alter the balance of power in government. However, the elections revealed two things. First, they symbolized the willingness of the USDP and the military to share power and compete in a free and fair political marketplace. Second, the elections highlighted the will of the people to engage in the political process and demand change.

By now, it would seem hardly possible to reverse the country's recent reforms: too many people's expectations have been raised.

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<sup>4</sup> Crisis Group Asia Report N°214, *Myanmar: A New Peace Initiative*, 30 November 2011

<sup>5</sup> Releasing Criminals and Kachin Conflict [http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/related\\_material/burma\\_2012.pdf](http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/related_material/burma_2012.pdf)

<sup>6</sup> [http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/21/world/asia/myanmar-abolishes-censorship-of-private-publications.html?\\_r=0](http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/21/world/asia/myanmar-abolishes-censorship-of-private-publications.html?_r=0)

### III. Project objectives, strategy, and implementation

**(i) Project strategy and approach**

The project's two key outcomes were defined by the Project Document as follows:

- Civil Society Organisations are equipped with Civic Education and Advocacy skills to make them aware of their role and capacity in shaping good local governance;
- Civil Society Organisations are equipped with Civic Education and Advocacy skills to become policy advocacy groups developing white papers for elected individuals;

However, to be understood properly, the project interventions must be seen in the perspective of a ME global training strategy. The diagram below provides a picture of the training interventions developed by ME and the relationship between the trainings and the financing it receives from the international community.

ME global training is articulated around three phases

- Phase I: Civil Empowerment (in remote areas)
- Phase II: Civil Society Leadership
- Phase III: Advocacy Unit formation

The table below demonstrates the articulation of the three phases with a specific emphasis on the Phase I (CERA) financed under UNDEF MYA-09-327.

Phase I: Initial/inception Training	Phase II: Intermediate Training	Phase III: Advanced training
Civil Empowerment in Remote Areas (CERA)	Civil Society Leadership training	Advocacy Unit Formation
Funded by UNDEF under UDF-MYA-09-327	Various donors for various training PCM : Pyoe Pin MC and CEAL/CEPA: SIDA; E-002 PPT: FES	Funded by the EU and managed by FNS
48 trainings in 14 states/regions over 2 years 48 Township Meetings in 14 states/regions	Project Cycle Management (PCM) Mass Communication (MC)  Civic Education and Applied Leadership (CEAL) and Civic Education and Policy Advocacy (CEPA)	State Market and Civil societies for Good Governance and Development
4 Core Leader meetings	E-002 Public Policy Training (PPT)	
Drafting of 14 White/Policy Papers		
Myanmar Policy Wiki website		

From the above we can see clearly that UNDEF funding of 250,000 USD has provided resources only for the first phase of the ME global training strategy.

The first phase activities identified as quantitative outputs in the Project Document were:

- 48 three-day trainings within two years in 14 States/Regions for 2880 individuals who will become “civically educated”;
- 48 townships level meetings back-to-back with the three day trainings;
- 4 Core Leaders Meetings of 40 participants each “playing a steering role in the project”
- Setting up website “Policy Watch” focusing on policy issuers and encompassing the 14 Federal States
- Setting Policy Advocacy (Basic) Units in 14 states/regions to produce 14 White/Policy Papers



**ME Trainers and Training participants in Hpa-An (February 2013)**

**(ii) Logical framework**

The building block of the project is to deliver, to a large audience in all 14 states of Myanmar, a broad-based training program that will bring direct knowledge on the functioning of Myanmar. It aims at creating a capacity for individual to engage into political affairs in general and more specifically in political affairs of the place where they are living.

The training program will also allow ME to identify high potential individuals that will eventually feed into other ME training but, more importantly, gather and draft targeted regional policy papers for wider dissemination and advocacy towards local actors and leaders

In more detail, the relationship between projects activities, outcomes, medium terms impacts and long term objectives is illustrated in the table below.

<b>Project Activities &amp; Interventions</b>	<b>Intended outcomes</b>	<b>Medium Term Impacts</b>	<b>Long Term Development Objectives</b>
<p><u>1. Four-day Trainings</u> Training Organizing Team selects suitable applicants, arranges venue, and attains government permission.</p> <p>Four to six trainers conduct the civic education training in remote areas (CERA). Participants learn about civil society and how to engage government.</p>	<p>Participants leave the training with a better understanding of how government operates and the active role they can play. Exceptionally talented and motivated participants go on to attend higher-tier Egress training in Yangon.</p>	<p>Participants go on to become politically active. They use the information gained from the training to: better educate their respective political parties, start their own training centres and CSOs, work effectively in local government, and hold government more accountable as an informed citizen.</p>	<p>Government decentralization in Myanmar is made more efficient. The end result is a local population that is aware of its rights, a vibrant civil society and a local government that is responsive to the needs of the population.</p>
<p><u>2. Township-Level Forum</u> Fourth day (partly) of CERA Training participants attend a forum in which they openly discuss their vision, mission and goals for the future.</p>	<p>Participants have a plan and direction of what to do after the trainings.</p>	<p>Participants follow their plan, and become more politically active.</p>	
<p><u>3. Core Leader Meetings</u> Over the course of 4 Core Leader Meetings, participants from the 4-day training and higher-tier Egress training collaborate on research projects. They decide relevant local issues and discuss how best to conduct research on this issues.</p>	<p>14 policy papers are produced that address regional issues.</p>	<p>The papers are disseminated to local and central government.</p>	<p>Politicians and government officials will be better informed on regional issues and take appropriate steps to address them.</p>
<p><u>4. Policy Website</u> The webmaster at Myanmar Egress is responsible for the creation, maintenance and continuous updating of a policy website.</p>	<p>Policy papers from the core leader meetings and other relevant information about government and CSOs will be posted.</p>	<p>Myanmar Egress alumni from the trainings will use the website to stay informed and educated. It will serve as a resource tool and support mechanism as they become politically active.</p>	<p>Civil Society in Myanmar will be better connected and informed; and thereby, able to hold government more accountable.</p>

## IV. EQ answers / findings

### (i) Relevance

In this given context the UNDEF funded training sought to “vitalize local governance”. According to the project document: *“Civil Society Organizations (CSO)s will be enlightened, empowered, and mobilized with civic education and advocacy skills. As a result, CSOs will be more alive and active with educated and spirited members who are convinced of their role in state building. Some of the trained persons with enhanced political literacy and advocacy skills may reach to the federal congress and local governing body.”*

The Government of Myanmar has long acted in a top-down centralized fashion. As of late, there has been a push for the decentralization of power and the institutionalization of regional government units. Local government in Myanmar is at a critical juncture as it seeks to define itself and its new roles and responsibilities. As the decentralization process continues, local government and civil society actors will require capacity building support and civic education training to properly transition into their new roles.

There are, of course other approaches to civil society strengthening that would be beneficial in these remote areas. Action Aid’s fellowship program, for instance, has been successful in mobilizing local communities to hold local government accountable in the provision of goods and services. However, Action Aid’s approach, as well as others such as Pyoe Pin and Proximity Designs, is not centered upon building capacity and civic education. Rather, their approaches mobilize local communities to aid in specific development activities. In their cases, civil society strengthening is only a by-product and not the primary focus. This is a significant difference with ME training programmes.

The UNDEF funded training was specifically designed for the sole purpose of building capacity in regional government and civil society. In addition, a plurality of approaches is also essential in civil society strengthening, rather than just scaling up a single support mechanism. In this respect ME training dovetails nicely with other civil society projects and research, such as Pyoe Pin’s block funding to CSOs.

The Egress training model is relevant. Indeed the need for civic education/empowerment in particular in remote areas is clearly on the increase with the positive evolution of the political and economic scene and in a CSO environment which has become more receptive to open political discourse. The training is articulated around the following courses and approaches. It should be noted that the training encompasses also the Township level policy forum, hence covering, the first and the second project activities under the logical framework (see above)

Subject matter	Duration	Period
<b>Comparative Constitutions</b>	3 h	Day 1
<b>Critical Thinking for Leadership</b>	3h	Day 1
<b>Political Economy of the State</b>	3h	Day 2
<b>State Institutions and Public Policy</b>	4h	Day2
<b>Civil Society and Gender: HR approach</b>	3h	Day 3
<b>Leadership and Negotiation</b>	4h	Day 3
<b>Communication and Advocacy</b>	1h	Day 4 (am)
<b>Globalisation Development and Environmental</b>	2h	Day 4 (am)
<b>Township level policy advocacy</b>	4h	Day 4 (pm)

**(ii) Effectiveness**

ME is the only organization in Myanmar able to implement a training program of this scope and breadth throughout the 14 States of the Union.

The quantitative targets of the project were achieved. The project has met or even outpaced its most prominent objectives, demonstrating the inner capacity of ME as an organization able to master interventions at a country broad level

Intervention	Nr of participants	Achievement	Nr of Trainings	Achievement	Nr of States	Achievement
<b>Activity 1 Four-day Trainings and Activity 2. Township level Forum</b>	2880	2938	48 within 24 months	48 within 24 months	14	14

The four Core Leaders groups (Activity 3) were held at regular intervals with the number of participants called for and in accordance with the time frame. The most significant change that should be noted is that, deviating from the original plan, the three last meetings were held with the same group of people, restricting significantly an exposure that was originally for 160 persons.

The web site (Activity 4) was implemented as planned.

However satisfying these results in quantitative terms, a qualitative look at how they were achieved gives some cause for concern. Even if the activities were implemented in accordance with the project document and within the tight time frame envisaged, it is to be doubted that they produced intended outcomes and impacts. The table below provides an overview.

Project Activities & Interventions	Intended outcomes	Medium Term Impacts
<u>1. Four-day Trainings.</u>	The objective has been achieved within the planned time frame. Training took place in a relevant format as forecasted in the project document	Whether participants will go on to become politically active remain to be seen; nevertheless a number of the interviewees felt they were more ready than ever to take part into the public debate.
<u>2. Township-Level Forum</u>	There was no evidence found that the half-day session have led participants to have a plan and direction.	Very unlikely under the current programme.
<u>3. Core Leader Meetings</u>	The 14 policy papers were indeed produced; Whether they truly address the regional issues is largely uncertain.	Dissemination (and status of the paper is unknown.
<u>4. Policy Website</u>	The website is up and running but it has not been possible to assess any of its parameters.	Very unlikely



## Training participants and content of the trainings

The selection of the audience appears to have been largely dictated by an informal network and mouth-to-ear approach rather than through more formal channels (publications, announcements, etc). In the present context where knowledge acquisition is so much in demand - witnessed by development of a burgeoning market for the services of training institutes – there will be no shortage of participants and no shortage of willingness to learn. This makes participant selection crucial.

Four criteria were used. Based on existing data collected during the project implementation, these were:

- **Gender:** 1783 (60%) of the participants was male; thus falling short of the goal of gender balance. In the program managers' defense, this is probably not too bad a performance in view of the fact that some states were receiving training for the first time.
- **Employment:** A vast majority (1852 participants or 63%) of the training beneficiaries are characterized as unemployed. The term "unemployed" covers also students so it is difficult to assess exactly what was the proportion of adult in an "unemployed" professional situation
- **Education:** 1749 (59%) of participants had level I education (primary or secondary school level), 1090 (37%) had graduate (O-level and bachelor) and 100 (3%) only had a master equivalent or above educational level. The training therefore had to remain at a very basic level in order to be understood by most of the audience. It also meant that the training may have had a tremendous impact for individuals with little previous exposure to the concepts covered.
- **Involvement in public life:** 536 participants (18%) were involved in political parties, the rest were involved in CSOs, but the precise definition of the term CSO was left vague.

Training participants interviewed spoke highly of the project and expressed a strong desire for more training; however, pedagogy seemed to be inadequate at times. Trainings were viewed as inflexible and were not tailored to regional issues. The same curriculum was used across all trainings, regardless of the local context. A more inclusive and less academic (classroom type) training approach was needed in order to make the trainings truly effective.

Audience perception of the training and favored subjects varied with initial motivation and experience. Individuals doing the training who had just finished education called for training modules on fundamental political issues (Constitutions; States Institutions and Public Policy, policy economy of the state). In contrast, trainees already involved in politics or CSO activities expressed a strong inclination to see more importance given to courses on critical thinking for leadership, leadership and negotiation, communication and advocacy and civil society and gender. A minority of participants stated that some subject matter was too advanced, and inappropriate for a four-day introductory course to civic education.

In the two focus groups held with ethnic minority participants, participants expressed problems in understanding in full the course content. Trainings were conducted in Burmese, rather than the participants' mother tongue. As a result, some participants stated they attended multiple trainings in an effort to better understand the material.

## Township-Level Forums

The effectiveness of the Township-Level Forums was weak. They provided a space for free discussion rather than a structured half-day session with solid results leading to a potential action plan and capacity to formulate initial issues for future policy papers. Participants were asked to state their mission, vision and goals, but no concrete deliverables or written action plans were produced. As such, much of the impetus built up during the training session was lost at the very moment where it would have been appropriate to draw up a concrete action

plan. The fact that the statement of mission, vision, and goals came at the end of three-and-half days of rather intensive training was not conducive to producing concrete outputs.

There was no systematic support to the participants after the forums. It is quite likely that a good portion of the results achieved by the training were rapidly dissipated.

### **Core Leader Meetings & Policy Papers**

The Core Leader Meetings (CLM) was held using two separate approaches involving significantly different methodologies. The first CLM was held gathering a sample of participants of the first five training session participants. It was originally thought that different audiences would hence participate to the following three CLM. However the likely poor outcome of the first CLM and the need to prepare consistent and coherent papers by the end of the project led to a change of approach. The three remaining CLMs were carried out with the same audience comprising a mix of training session participants and more experienced writers/drafters. This change of methodology demonstrates the flexibility in implementation that the organization was able to apply. At the same time, it is a sign of the difficulties experienced in getting the model on stream the way it was initially constructed and indicates that initial ambitions were hard to fulfill.

The policy papers were drafted by September 2012; however, their dissemination has been limited. In fact, the mission found little evidence that the policy papers were distributed at all save for a book which is essentially a compendium of policy papers without foreword or explanation of the aim and the process which led to their drafting. The reason may lie in the intrinsic quality of the papers which the mission has not been able to review in full because of the quantity produced. Nevertheless a review of the themes and of the structure shows that some of the themes were rather mundane and that a rather heterogeneous structure was being used. The mission did not collect any evidence of peer review which might allay their contents.

In addition, authors of the policy papers are unsure of their legal right to disseminate their papers. They share the belief that Egress will disseminate the papers appropriately at higher levels of government, but there is no focus of dissemination at the local level.

### **Website**

The website <http://myanmarpolicywiki.net/> was found to be well organized and regularly updated; however, it falls short of its intended purpose of promoting “social mobilization” and “Enhance[ing] social mobility and continual capacity of the trained persons.” None of the training participants interviewed has ever used the website or were aware of its existence. While the content may be valuable, internet usage is lower in Myanmar than any other South East Asian country. Despite a number of requests from the mission to obtain codes which would allow it to extract basic data (number of hits, downloads, forums etc...) from the website through non-intrusive web search tools, none of them were successful. It is not therefore possible to thoroughly assess website effectiveness or efficiency except that saying discussion with the person in charge were far from giving the impression of real competencies. Last but not least, the website has not been functional for a long period of time due to problems with the webhost supplier.

### ***(iii) Efficiency***

#### **Cost Efficiency**

The funding to hold Activities 1 and 2 amounted to slightly more than 64% of the total project costs with managerial costs (largely targeted to training overall organization) representing only 23.5% of the project cost. In these circumstances, efficiency as measured by training cost per person trained has been reasonable -- about 50 USD per individual for a four day-training cum township level forum session.

The cost of the Core Leader meetings (Activity 3) was relatively small (5.5% of project costs) although it would have better to give it more importance to support more effective dissemination activities.

The website (Activity 4) costs were also small (less than 7%) as a proportion of the overall costs. However, based upon the observations made above under Effectiveness, it may be questioned whether it was worth the funding.

ME initial costing can be assessed as too tight for an ambitious training program. The mission identified clear tensions at all levels, from the project management team to the trainers and to the trainees, regarding budget requirements. There was too much to do with the restricted resources available.

### **Efficiency of Implementation**

According to project trainers, the top five constraints to implementation were:

- 1) Receiving government permission for training in remote areas.
- 2) Transport logistics and expenses for participants and trainers.
- 3) Language barriers
- 4) Operating conditions in remote areas (i.e. poor training facilities, health risks, spotty telecommunications)
- 5) Sourcing accommodation for training team.

By far, the greatest hindrance to implementing efficiency was receiving government permission. In many instances Myanmar Egress received approval from higher-level government authorities to conduct training only a few days before the planned sections. In some instances, trainings were then postponed, cut short, or cancelled because permissions were revoked at the last minute or local officials had not been notified.

The second hindrance was the training location. Of course this was a salient point of the program: providing civic education in “remote” areas. While operating in remote areas hinders implementing efficiency, it is a tribute to ME that they have been able to reach these areas. No other organization in the country appears to be capable of this.

### ***(iii) Impact***

The impact has to be looked at in the perspective of the logical framework.

#### **1. Support to the institutionalization of the regional governments.**

Training participants have gone on to “vitalize” local governance. The knowledge they have acquired from training allows them to: better educate their respective political parties, start their own training centers and CSOs, work effectively in local government, hold government more accountable as an informed citizen and so on. Although, ME keeps in contact with its network of over 40,000 alumni, there is regrettably no systematic monitoring of what alumni are doing now. Still, many of the training participants we spoke with made serious changes in their lives. Many were spreading on the information they gained by opening up their own training institutes or mobilizing issue related CSOs.

It is difficult to attribute these changes directly to the project. The political landscape is changing quickly in Myanmar, and many people who have not participated in the training are also becoming politically active. The issue is whether participants changed their political trajectory due to the training course or were already becoming politically active and therefore attended the training. Lines of causality remain unclear and probably run in both directions.

Training participants gave various responses as to what they gained from the training. The most common comment was that they gained the “confidence” and “social skills” necessary to engage with government.

It is perhaps this change in personal perception that is the most important impact of the project, rather than the technical training that participants received. This also speaks to the project’s sustainability.

**Mr Min Min Nwe** has followed the initial one week training and “gained a lot of knowledge from it”; “It also broadened my network as I met people I did not know about”. Min Min Nwe is administrative editor of Thanlwin Times Journal, the newspaper with the largest circulation in Mawlamyine for the Mon State; The participation to the training allowed him to prepare “better subject matter news” and allow him “to consult more people in the civil society”; He is aware of the policy paper prepared by Myanmar Egress and is willing to write in the newspaper on the papers giving them an increased public exposure.

**2. The township level meetings**

What may be one of the most important outcomes of the training has not been exploited as it should have been. The absence of concrete plans at the end of the training sessions speaks to the lack of impact of the entire process.

**3. The Generation of Policy Papers**

Research that addresses local concerns and brings them to the forefront of national debate is greatly needed; however, the impact of the project’s policy papers has yet to be seen as they are poorly disseminated. Their quality should not also be taken at face value. The absence of any policy for dissemination wasted their potential impact at states/regions level.

**4. Serving as a Feeder Program to higher-tier Egress training**

The four-day UNDEF funded training also served as a feeder program to Egress’s 3-month training based in Yangon. While joining the four-day training is not a pre-requisite, these participants were a source of capable applicants. They were also preferred to other applicants, because Egress was already familiar with their ability and motivation, expediting the selection process. The four-day training participants were also from remote areas, meaning that their potential impact is greater than those from Yangon or other urban areas.

Unfortunately, many eager and able participants from the four-day training are unable to attend second-tier training. Despite financial assistance provided by Egress, second-tier training is expensive and requires a large time commitment that most participants with families and careers cannot afford. It is often the young and unemployed participants from the four-day training that continue to second-tier trainings.

**(iv) Sustainability**

There is little question that ME training will continue to be in great demand. Evidence includes the growing number of training institutes which can be spotted in Yangon and the number of requests for meeting that the mission attracted through a few simple phone calls.

There appears to be a great deal of positive “knock-on effects” (i.e. participants starting up a training school or CSO, or in political office). However, assessing the relative worth of these effects would be a highly subjective and fruitless exercise. Suffice it to say, they are ample. It is also worthwhile noting that three of the individuals met by the evaluation mission (implementers and trainees) have created “private” training institutes: two in Yangon (Sun Institute) and one in Mawlamyine. While developing market economy skills during the day, these institutes appear to be disseminating more democracy focused training after office hours.

Participants appear to vary in occupation and activities before and after the program. After the program, some participants are working more closely with civil society, the media and local government. Responses were mixed as to whether these changes in actions were brought about by the training or the changing political situation. Direct lines of causality are hard to identify.

The most common reply about the program's impact on participants' lives is that it gave them confidence and the social skills necessary to engage local government or to function effectively in groups. This change of perception seemed the most common outcome though many respondents had difficulty describing how this confidence led to concrete actions.

This global approach developed by the organization makes even more important the UNDEF funded training as it can be seen at the point of entry into ME training process and as an induction training aiming at identifying high potential individual that will be able to be imparted and involved into secondary and tertiary training.

#### **(v) UNDEF Value Added**

Without the funding provided by UNDEF, it is unlikely that ME would have been able to undertake country-wide induction training and impart training to audiences which have largely been forgotten by the donor community or have been difficult to reach for political reasons. UNDEF funding was well spent and had a significant impact far beyond its value.

Interviews and discussions held with ME management demonstrated the significant importance which was accorded to a funding from UNDEF. Though too limited in scope, according to ME management, UNDEF funding provided a visibility which by far exceeds the relatively limited amount of a quarter million USD. In Myanmar's current "donor darling" honeymoon, obtaining funding from, e.g., EU, SIDA, DfID through Pyoe Pin, or German foundations is not seen as a constraint. However, whereas other donors have low visibility, the UN "brand" is universally recognized in Myanmar.

**Mrs Aye Mya Hlaing and Phyu Yamin Myat** have been staff members of Myanmar Egress for over 10 years and have gone through the various steps of Egreteisation. They were actively involved in managing and implementing ME interventions; In the light of the quality of their work, they were entrusted with the management of the UNDEF project. The managerial experience accumulated in implementing the complex UNDEF activities with its very tight budget gave them confidence in building their own practices; Whereas and Phyu Yamin Mya joined a new but existing training structure as partner, Aye Mya Hlaing created her own training practice ([www.thesuninstitute.com](http://www.thesuninstitute.com)) which provides a number of courses on management and leadership but is also a forum for discussion on the present political and economic evolution; Most recent examples of lecture and workshop would be on 30th April, 2013 the lecture on "Constitutional Issues for Political Parties given by Richard Horsey and the three-day workshop on Myanmar Constitutional Democracy given with assistance of the Sydney Law School.

**Mr Ye Htut** has been a training participant in Hpa-An and enjoyed the benefit of being involved in core leader meetings; He was selected as one of the two drafter of the policy papers for the Kayin state. "I enjoyed the trainings" but "I thought the papers were not going farther enough"; He joined a local CSO on the ground that "In Myanmar, civil society is political by essence and when it strong it is a political forum for discussion" and became involved in the providing analysis to people in their struggle against the development of the cement industry in Kayin State. Ye Htut is also now involved in researches and consultancy for other groups

## V. Conclusions

*i. UNDEF-funded ME trainings were relevant as they served the decentralization process ongoing in Myanmar* by supporting the creation of regional units. This institutionalization scheme gave participants the mindset and skills required to vitalize civil society as well as engage and build the capacity of local government. ***The training outreach spread over the 14 regions, is in line with this process and further expose civil society to significant and structured information.*** This conclusion derives from the finding on relevance.

*ii. The UNDEF funded training was able to achieve quantifiable goals. It has proven to be an effective delivery method for civic education.* Furthermore, ME has a ***strong relationship with the central government, making it the only organization that can provide civil society training in certain areas.*** There is, however, room for improvement in future if this training is to be replicated. The below section on recommendations further elaborate on this point. This conclusion derives from the findings related to effectiveness and impact.

*iii. Despite significant difficulties in implementing the training largely owed to the local authorities' lack of responsiveness in delivering the necessary authorization,* the program was implemented in full within the time frame set of it. ***There was excellent Value for Money but the conservatism adopted by ME in its initial costing may have led to tensions with implementers*** (trainers and management) and participants in operating within the strict parameters of the approved budget. This conclusion derives from findings on efficiency.

*iv. Although Myanmar Egress lacks a systematic means of monitoring alumni activity, alumni stay closely connected via an alumni association. It is obvious from the individual interviews that the program has made a tangible difference in peoples' lives. Although lines of causality are unclear, many program participants are now more politically active.* The knowledge they have acquired from training allows them to: better educate their respective political parties, start their own training centers and CSOs, work effectively in local government, hold government more accountable as an informed citizens and so on. This conclusion derives from the finding on impact.

*v. The project has created an initial impetus for political change at a regional level. Participants' perception of government has changed.* They view themselves as rights-holders that can engage the government and hold it accountable to provide quality goods and services in a timely manner. The physical manifestation of this paradigm shift is apparent in the Impact section of this report. ***The project has also created a desire for continued learning. This is evidenced through the training institutes that participants and implementers themselves have created.*** In this aspect alone, the project proves its sustainability. These centers may continue to teach civic education after the Egress funding and trainings have ceased. The subject material they teach is also likely to be specific to regional concerns and taught in the local language.

**vi. UNDEF funding has been instrumental in getting ME initial/induction training implemented and there is a good fit between the UNDEF funding and ME management of the activities:** The level of funding that UNDEF has been able to provide is commensurate with the size of the program; UNDEF reporting (financial and technical) is light and matches ME team managerial capacity; UNDEF funding label gives Myanmar Egress a visibility that it uses at its best. Last a brief analysis of the development scene shows that it is very unlikely that any other organizations geared toward assisting civil society would have been able to implement a training program of this scope in all regions/states of Myanmar. It is a distinct comparative advantage of ME that it is able to have this outreach. This conclusion derives from the findings on UNDEF value added.

## VI. Recommendations

**i. The course content should be tailored to local demands and regional issues where possible. This would entail a longer training set-up period and related costs.** Myanmar Egress can use its large alumni network and its training organization team to determine what local issues would be relevant and should be included in the training. Participants expressed varied interests in course topics. For example, participants in political parties desired more training in the electoral processes and campaigning. Selected course participants could be given a list of subjects to choose from, and trainers could concentrate only on the most preferred topics. This would have a particular value in the perspective of the democratic agenda and the 2015 electoral process. This recommendation derives from conclusion (ii).

**ii. Trainings should contain fewer monologues and more dialogue. The trainings should step away from the traditional lecture-based teaching style and should make way for more group discussion and consensus building.** The training content will gain by being more focused and less general; the number of domain/subject matters should be carefully assessed and on the basis of lessons learnt by trainers, trimmed down to a lesser number. It will gain in depth and in substance and is likely to bring more added value to participants. This recommendation derives from conclusion (ii).

**iii. The issue of language is a difficult one to deal with but has been cited a number of times; whereas participants from ethnic minorities accord importance to the use of vernacular language,** ME's inclination – if not implicit policy – is to use Burmese language throughout the trainings. It has also to be taken into account that the trainees appear to be largely – if not all - of Burmese language origin. Our approach would be to continue to use the Burmese language to avoid unnecessarily regionalism at a time where the political and economic context is evolving favorably. This recommendation derives from conclusion (ii)

**iv. Any future funding should be reviewed on the increase without affecting overtly the program efficiency** or any of the other evaluation criteria while giving to implementers' room for delivering higher and better quality services. This recommendation derives from conclusion (iii)

**v. Township-Level forums must be more structured, with measurable outputs and linked to continued support to participants. It should become the cornerstone of the training against which success is ultimately gauged.** It is there and not through the use of local languages, that differences should be expressed. The momentum built up after four days of training should be turned into action. Participants should articulate their goals and walk away from the forum with both an individual and collective action plan. To this end, it is worth considering either to expand the duration of Township Level forums to a full day or alternatively to extend the duration of the forum as a whole and give it a more detail, output oriented structure. This recommendation derives from conclusion (iii and iv).

**vi. The evaluators recommend an improved communication strategy. The policy papers must be widely disseminated at both the national and regional levels.** This means presenting the papers directly to local government and publishing abstracts in local newspapers. The policy papers should also be printed and distributed widely to CSOs and political parties. The quality of the papers should be reviewed and vetted by reputable sources so that they become real benchmarks for policymakers, media and other CSOs in general. An online presence in and of itself is important for an organization. Likewise, a centralized source of pertinent information and policy papers is useful for reference. **While the merits of having the website can be argued and could very well be worth the cost, the website should not be viewed as a tool for capacity building of trained persons or as a means of civic education dissemination.** Clearly the website while useful to the organization is outside the remit of the program funded by UNDEF. The resources allocated should be used for other more relevant purposes and for instance the printing and distribution of policy papers. This recommendation derives from conclusion (iii and iv).

**vii. Budget should be reviewed with additional resources allocated to a single training session. It will ease up the constraint on trainers, allow quality material to disseminate and better logistical conditions** for the training session. In the event a new program is envisaged, it is not suggested to decrease the number of training sessions given the thrust for knowledge and information that cuts across the Myanmar society. This recommendation derives from conclusion (iii)

**viii. ME would need to develop tools to monitor its two category target populations, i.e. young educated people that wishes to develop their skills to take an active part in society and more mature and experienced individuals who, after decades of misinformation, want to be proactive in developing their social, economic and political role.** For the first category, it has been difficult during the mission to understand whom of the first tier has been able to benefit from the second or third tiers. For the second group, the fact that training is longer term (3 months or more) and based in Yangon are serious impediments. Indeed, only a handful of persons involved in professional activities may actually be able to devote a sizeable period of time to ME higher tier training. Serious thought should be given to remedying this situation. In the perspective of next elections and of the advancement of reform, whether political or economic, persons belonging to this category of people have the highest potential to become the agents of change that ME called for. This recommendation derives from Conclusion (iv).



## **VII. Overall assessment and closing thoughts**

In the context of the democratic agenda on which Myanmar is firmly engaged and with the 2015 elections in sight, the present project has been useful for the reasons that have been outlined through the report. However if there is one single element that needs to be strengthened in the future, it would be the increased importance that must be accorded to Township Level Meetings. These meetings, if properly designed and prepared, can make a huge difference for the participants.

Moreover, the mission believes it would be important that UNDEF continue to be present in Myanmar. A continuation of the funding should, despite UNDEF reluctance to finance “second phase” projects, not be ruled out without careful consideration. It will nevertheless require some adjustments that are recommended in other sections of this report. Likewise UNDEF should not be adverse to other proposals dealing more directly with the upcoming electoral process.

## VIII. ANNEXES

### ANNEX 1: EVALUATION QUESTIONS

DAC criterion	Evaluation Question	Related sub-questions
Relevance	To what extent was the project, as designed and implemented, suited to context and needs at the beneficiary, local, and national levels?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Were the objectives of the project in line with the needs and priorities for democratic development, given the context?</li> <li>▪ Should another project strategy have been preferred rather than the one implemented to better reflect those needs, priorities, and context? Why?</li> <li>▪ Were risks appropriately identified by the projects? How appropriate are/were the strategies developed to deal with identified risks? Was the project overly risk-averse?</li> </ul>
Effectiveness	To what extent was the project, as implemented, able to achieve objectives and goals?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ To what extent have the project's objectives been reached?</li> <li>▪ To what extent was the project implemented as envisaged by the project document? If not, why not?</li> <li>▪ Were the project activities adequate to make progress towards the project objectives?</li> <li>▪ What has the project achieved? Where it failed to meet the outputs identified in the project document, why was this?</li> </ul>
Efficiency	To what extent was there a reasonable relationship between resources expended and project impacts?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Was there a reasonable relationship between project inputs and project outputs?</li> <li>▪ Did institutional arrangements promote cost-effectiveness and accountability?</li> <li>▪ Was the budget designed, and then implemented, in a way that enabled the project to meet its objectives?</li> </ul>
Impact	To what extent has the project put in place processes and procedures supporting the role of civil society in contributing to democratization, or to direct promotion of democracy?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ To what extent has/have the realization of the project objective(s) and project outcomes had an impact on the specific problem the project aimed to address?</li> <li>▪ Have the targeted beneficiaries experienced tangible impacts? Which were positive; which were negative?</li> <li>▪ To what extent has the project caused changes and effects, positive and negative, foreseen and unforeseen, on democratization?</li> <li>▪ Is the project likely to have a catalytic effect? How? Why? Examples?</li> </ul>
Sustainability	To what extent has the project, as designed and implemented, created what is likely to be a continuing impetus towards democratic development?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ To what extent has the project established processes and systems that are likely to support continued impact?</li> <li>▪ Are the involved parties willing and able to continue the project activities on their own (where applicable)?</li> </ul>
UNDEF value-added	To what extent was UNDEF able to take advantage of its unique position and comparative advantage to achieve results that could not have been achieved had support come from other donors?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ What was UNDEF able to accomplish, through the project, that could not as well have been achieved by alternative projects, other donors, or other stakeholders (Government, NGOs, etc).</li> <li>▪ Did project design and implementing modalities exploit UNDEF's comparative advantage in the form of an explicit mandate to focus on democratization issues?</li> </ul>

## **Annex 2: DOCUMENTS REVIEWED**

### **UNDEF**

- Project Document Myanmar Egress – Fourth Round - 16/11/2010
- 2 Milestone Verification Reports from UNDP Yangon

### **Myanmar Egress**

- Project Narrative Report – 5/5/2011
- Project Narrative Report – 7/21/2011
- Project Narrative Report – Midterm report before 3rd Milestone – 1/5/2011 (?)
- Project Narrative Report – Third Milestone – 7/31/2012
- Project Narrative Report – Third Milestone- Final – 1/31/2013
- Final Narrative Report, including Annexes
- Certificate Course for Civil Society (E-304)
- Application Form E 304 (certificate course of Civil Education for Civil Society)
- Course Structure E 304
- Selected presentation in English of course E 304
- Compendium of White Policy Papers

### **Other sources**

- “Human Development Report 2011”, United Nations Development Program, 2011.
- Control Risks: Risk Map Report 2013. Section view from Yangon (pages 75 to 80)

## ANNEX 3: SCHEDULE OF INTERVIEWS

Name	Gender	Organisation	Position
<b>Monday February 18th, 2013</b>			
Tin Maung Thann	M	Myanmar Egress	President
Khin Moe Samm	F	Myanmar Egress	Chief Executive
Nan Theingi Myint	F	Myanmar Egress	UNDEF Project Manager
Htike Htike Aung	F	Myanmar Egress	UNDEF Asst Project Manager
Aye Mya Hlaing	F	Myanmar Egress	UNDEF Project Director (Former) and Sun Institute director (at present)
Phyu Yamin Myat	F	Myanmar Egress	UNDEF Asst Project Director (Former) and member of a training institutes.
Yu Mon Thein	F	Myanmar Egress	UNDEF Project Accountant
Khin Chan Myae Tun	F	Myanmar Egress	UNDEF Project Admin
Jousha	M	Myanmar Egress	Web Developer
Saw Min Wai	F	Myanmar Egress	UNDEF Project Trainer
Naing Lynn Htun	M	Myanmar Egress	UNDEF Project Trainer
Aung Ko Ko	M	Myanmar Egress	UNDEF Project Trainer
Phyo Thandar	F	Myanmar Egress	UNDEF Project Trainer
<b>Tuesday February 19th, 2013</b>			
Shihab Uddin Ahamad	M	Action Aid Myanmar	Country Director
Tauhid Ibne Farid	M	Action Aid Myanmar	DRR Project Manager
Boon Thein	M	Action Aid Myanmar	Advisor (Government Relations)
Andreas List	M	EU	Head of EU Office in Myanmar
Omar Dawoodjee	M	UNDP - RC Office	Political Analyst
Phyone Pthet Thet Kyaw	F	DfiD	Project Manager
<b>Wednesday February 20th, 2013</b>			
Kyaw San Win	M	National Enlightenment Institute	President (previous training participant)
Aung Naing Maw	M	Myanmar Egress	Volunteer(previous training participant and core team member)
Min Han Tala Mon	M	Mawlamyine University	1 <sup>st</sup> Year Student(previous training participant and core team member)
Min Min Nwe	M	Thanlwin Time Journal	Administrative Editor(Previous training participant)
<b>Thursday February 21st, 2013</b>			
Kyaw Thu Khine	M	NRC NGO	Staff(previous training participant)
Naw Lakhu	F		Retired Professor(previous training participant)
Saw Samuel	M	KPP Party	Auditor(previous training participant)
Han Wai Khine	F	Small Enterprise	Owner(previous training participant)
Thu Zar Moe	F	Small Enterprise	Owner(previous

			training participant)
Nan Aye Bay Nay Zar	F	Myanmar Egress	Trainer(previous core team member)
Ye Htut	M	Mon Social Development Network	Program Coordinator (Previous training participant and core team member)
<b>Friday February 22nd, 2013</b>			
Peter McDermott	M	DfID	Service Delivery Adviser, Deputy Head of Office
Khin Moe Samm	F	Myanmar Egress	Chief Executive
Nan Theingi Myint	F	Myanmar Egress	UNDEF Project Manager
Htike Htike Aung	F	Myanmar Egress	UNDEF Assistant Project Manager
Aye Mya Hlaing	F	Sun Institute (Training CSO)	Principal
Frank Momberg	M	Fauna and Flora International	Asia Director based in Yangon

## ANNEX 4: ACRONYMS

DfID	Department for International Cooperation
EU	European Union
CEAL	Civic Education and Applied Leadership
CEPA	Civic Education and Policy Advocacy
CERA	Civic Education in Remote Areas
CLM	Core Leader Meeting
CSO	Civil Society Organization
ME	Myanmar Egress
FES	Friedrich Eibert Stiftung
FFI	Fauna and Flora International
FNS	Friedrich Naumann Stiftung
MC	Mass Communication
PPT	Public Policy Training
UNDEF	United Nations Democracy Fund
UNDP	United Nations Development Fund