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**POST PROJECT EVALUATIONS
FOR THE
UNITED NATIONS DEMOCRACY FUND**

EVALUATION REPORT

**UDF-17-740-BKF
Jeunesse et participation électorale au Burkina Faso**

23 May 2022

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Disclaimer

The views expressed in this report are those of the evaluator. They do not represent those of UNDEF or of any of the institutions referred to in the report.

Author

This report was written by Kevin Lyne.

Project Area

This project covered five cities/towns in Burkina Faso: Ouagadougou, Bobo Dioulasso, Ouahigouya, Dédougou and Ziniaré.



Members of AJEA with human rights groups in Bobo Dioulasso (L) and Dédougou (R)



Members of AJEA with the President of the Commission Électorale Nationale Indépendante (CENI), Mr Ahmed Newton Barry.



Members of AJEA with the Governor of the region of the North (Ouahigouya)

I. OVERALL ASSESSMENT

This report is the evaluation of the project entitled “Jeunesse et participation électorale au Burkina Faso”. It was implemented by the *Association Jeunesse Espoir d’Afrique* (AJEA), from 01 February 2019 to 31 January 2021, and focused on increasing youth participation in the legislative and presidential elections in Burkina Faso of 22 November 2020. The project benefitted from a UNDEF grant of USD 165,000 to carry out the following activities:

- Training for the monitoring of biometric registration, and the monitoring itself.
- Awareness raising on the importance of biometric registration and social cohesion, and youth participation in this; using radio broadcasts, conferences, town criers, and public (humorous) podium events.
- Training for the monitoring of violence, and the monitoring itself.
- Training for the establishment of a conflict prevention mechanism, focusing on the mediation of electoral conflicts through religious/traditional community leaders.
- Elaboration of a Code of Good Conduct for electoral candidates.

The primary target beneficiaries of the project were youth, women, and political leaders, directly involving some 6,500 individuals, as well as members of the wider public in five regions: Ouagadougou, Bobo Dioulasso, Ouahigouya, Dédougou and Ziniaré.

Overall Achievements

Although on a modest scale, the project has impacted positively on the democratic development of Burkina Faso – at a time, during 2019-2020, when democratic gains from the 2015 elections needed to be sustained and extended. Spreading over the full electoral cycle (from registration to ballot day) it comprised well planned and executed interventions that exceeded expectations in terms of direct and indirect beneficiaries and media outreach. Gains in youth participation, conflict prevention and resolution, public awareness raising, and use of religious and traditional community leaders to reinforce key messages – are considerable achievements. And all of this against the backdrop of a highly volatile political and security situation, and COVID-19. Experience and materials from the project (such as the creative use of podium events with professional entertainers, and the groundwork done for the Code of Good Conduct) are highly transferable to the realities of the current context following the coup of 22-23 January 2022 – and the transition period before the next elections possibly in 2025. In the words of a representative of the Ministry for Youth: “AJEA has a real role to play in the future democratic development of Burkina Faso.”

Key Recommendations

- Experience, lessons and materials from the project should be captured and kept in play as valid contributions for the transition period and the next elections – expected in 2025. Of particular value are the positive responses to the social outreach (podium) events, use of religious/traditional leaders for conflict prevention and resolution, and the Code of Good Conduct.

- AJEA could consider ways of making more project information available online through its Facebook page – for example by providing links to key documents (such as the Code of Good Conduct), and by helping readers understand the impact of projects that have concluded, and any lessons learned. This could be particularly useful in the transition period currently underway, and for preparations for the next elections.
- UNDEF guidance for Grantees online, in English and French, is comprehensive – including on best practice for Results Frameworks. Checking progress against Results Frameworks is an integral part of monitoring progress, in addition to the established practice of reporting on Milestones. Grantees need to take these reporting obligations seriously, given (a) they exist to help grantees self-monitor progress and (b) they facilitate the UNDEF Project Officer’s understanding of actual progress by providing snap-shot-type measurements at the time of reporting. AJEA should review the guidance and reflect on how they might have improved on their end-of-project reporting. Learning from this would stand them in good stead for any future UNDEF, or other, project work.

Key Lessons Learned

- Where demographic trends demonstrate a rapidly growing young population, as is the case in much of West Africa and the Sahel region, CSOs with a focus on youth (and associated challenges of social cohesion) are likely to be suitably impactful beneficiaries of support from UNDEF and other donors.
- International support for elections in fragile and conflict-affected countries, including contributions from civil society, may often require sensitive coordination to maximise impact and avoid duplication of effort. OHCHR Human Rights Advisers and OHCHR Country Offices (where they exist, as is now the case in Burkina Faso) seem particularly well qualified to take a leading role in such coordination.
- When supporting electoral processes there is clear value in working “upstream” to cover, and connect, key aspects of the full electoral cycle (e.g. registration, awareness raising, monitoring, conflict prevention and resolution) before the election event itself. Where possible, this can also include linkages with initiatives promoting access to information and freedom of speech – i.e. ensuring that electoral choices are as well informed as possible and contribute to community dialogue and improving social cohesion. A new civil society platform for the Sahel, the *Coalition citoyenne pour le Sahel*, appears to be a promising forum for just such interaction.
- Sensitivity to local languages should be an essential part of project design and delivery in countries where such diversity exists, though this may bring additional challenges in terms of measuring and evaluating the success of an intervention.
- Grantees need to be disciplined in their monitoring and reporting, making best use of the comprehensive guidance available on the UNDEF website. Grantees should feel free to suggest to UNDEF alternative baselines, target indicators and means of verification if data collection against initially planned Results Frameworks proves more difficult than expected or impossible.

II. PROJECT CONTEXT AND STRATEGY

(i) Development Context

Burkina Faso is in the interior of West Africa and is part of the Central Sahel region which in recent years has seen a “perfect storm” of conflict, weak governance, underdevelopment, demographic pressure, and climate change.¹ Its HDI (Human Development Index) scoring for 2020 placed it at 182 out of 189 countries and territories.² Population is 20.9 million, with an annual population growth of 2.86%. Almost half the population is under 15 years old, and the median age is 17.6 years. On current projections, the population is expected to more than double over the next 30 years.³

Experiencing repeated military coups during the 1970s and 1980s, Burkina Faso was ruled by President Blaise Compaoré for 27 years from 1987, until he stepped down in 2014 following mass protests against plans to extend his rule. After an attempted military coup by military supporters of Compaoré in 2015, multiparty elections were held later that same year and won by Roch Marc Kaboré – who had served as Prime Minister and Speaker of Parliament under Compaoré. Against a backdrop of growing insecurity, with the spread of jihadist groups from Mali and Niger,⁴ general elections were held again on 22 November 2020. Kaboré was returned to office and the ruling People’s Movement for Progress (*Mouvement du Peuple pour le Progrès*, MPP) party and its allies held a comfortable majority in the National Assembly. Voter turnout was down to 50%, from 60% in 2015. These elections were deemed to be transparent, credible and satisfactory by independent national and international observers.⁵

In December 2021, on the first visit to Burkina Faso by a UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Michelle Bachelet described the numerous challenges facing the country in the following terms:

“Burkina Faso is today facing a multitude of challenges with severe impacts on a wide range of human rights of its people. Violent extremist groups are increasingly launching devastating attacks throughout the country, particularly in the regions bordering Mali and Niger. Climate change is stripping the livelihoods of farmers and herders, leading to more conflicts and

¹ Ministerial Meeting (as part of the High-Level Humanitarian Event) on the Central Sahel on 20 October 2020, Hosted by the UN, EU, Denmark and Germany. Statement by Ilze Brands Kehris, UN Assistant Secretary-General for Human Rights, New York,

<https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=26422&LangID=E>.

² UNDP Human Development Report 2020, <http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/latest-human-development-index-ranking>.

³ World Population Review, <https://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/burkina-faso-population>.

⁴ These groups included groups affiliated with Al-Qa’ida and Islamic State, causing large-scale displacements of population from 2016. At the time of the 2020 elections, 17.7% of the national territory was excluded from the electoral process, with 5% of polling stations unable to open.

⁵ “Transparent and credible” : CODEL (Convention des Organisations de la société civile pour l’Observation Domestique des Élections), *Rapport de l’Observation des Élections Couplées Présidentielle et Législatives du 22 novembre 2020 au Burkina Faso*, available at <https://www.codel.bf/rapport-dobservation-des-elections-couplees-presidentielle-et-legislatives-de-2020-au-burkina-faso/>. “Satisfactory”: Report of the Election Observation Mission of the African Union, available at <https://au.int/en/documents/20201221/aeom-election-report-burkina-faso>.

affecting access to water, food, health and education. An already difficult humanitarian situation has become much more dire, with more than 3.5 million in need of humanitarian assistance – a 60 per cent increase since January last year. [...] How the country faces these challenges will be decisive for its future. The fact that Burkina Faso successfully held peaceful legislative and presidential elections last year is, I believe, indicative of a deep desire to preserve the democratic and human rights progress the country has made in recent years – and gives much cause for hope.”⁶

At the time of this visit, political tensions were running high in Burkina Faso - with President Kaboré being criticised for the deteriorating security crisis, including from elements within the Army.

Following military unrest over the weekend of 22-23 January 2022, the civilian government was dissolved, along with the constitution and National Assembly. A military Junta (Mouvement patriotique pour la sauvegarde et la restauration – MPSR) led by Lt Colonel Paul Henri Sandaogo Damiba claimed responsibility for these acts – and Damiba was sworn in as President on 3 March 2022. Transition arrangements currently under discussion include the possibility of elections within three years. The coup and lengthy transition plans have been widely criticised by the international community. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has suspended Burkina Faso but has not (yet) imposed sanctions as it has done on neighbouring Mali and Guinea where coups have also taken place in the last 18 months.

The COVID-19 pandemic has added to these problems in Burkina Faso, which is deemed to be one of the most vulnerable countries in West Africa to the virus – with hygiene standards and limited ability to track and treat infections posing significant risks.⁷ The full effects of COVID-19, especially on governance and trust in government institutions in the region, have yet to be fully seen.

(ii) Project Objectives and Intervention Rationale

The full title of the project was “Jeunesse et participation électorale au Burkina Faso” (Youth and Electoral Participation in Burkina Faso).

The Grantee, *Association Jeunesse Espoir d’Afrique* (AJEA), describes itself as a non-profit, non-religious, apolitical Civil Society Organisation (CSO) that promotes good governance, human rights, gender, peace and sub-regional integration in Burkina Faso.⁸ It was established in 2005 and officially recognised in 2008.

⁶ Address by UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Michelle Bachelet, at the conclusion of her visit to Burkina Faso on 1 December 2021, at <https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=27887&LangID=E>. An OHCHR Country Office was established in Ouagadougou in November 2021, following an agreement reached between the Government and the UN on 6 October 2021.

⁷ See French (AFD) assessment at: <https://www.afd.fr/fr/carte-des-projets/appui-au-plan-national-de-riposte-au-covid-19-du-burkina-faso>.

⁸ As described on its Facebook page at <https://www.facebook.com/ajea226/>.

For the implementation of the project, AJEA worked in partnership with the *Reseau des organisations de la société civile pour une observation citoyenne des élections* (RESOCEL) which brings together more than 100 CSOs across the country and was established in 2015 for the general elections of that year.

The project started on 01 February 2019 and ended on 31 January 2021.

The overall objective of the project was **to contribute to increasing youth participation in the combined legislative and presidential elections of 22 November 2020**, recognising that: biometric registration should be successful, with a large number of young people enrolled; there should be reconciliation within the political class that had been weakened and divided after the mass protests of 2014; and elections should take place without violence in target areas for the project. The municipal elections of 2016 had been disrupted by violence and social tension, with high numbers of young people choosing, through manipulation, to reject the opportunity to vote in preference for using violence as a vehicle for change.

Three major problems identified by the Grantee and elaborated in the Project Document (PD) of December 2018 were:

- Low inscription levels of young people on the electoral register.
- Social and political tension generated by the mass protests of 2014.
- Fresh outbreaks of electoral violence.

Three outcomes were envisaged:

Outcome 1: Youth participation in monitoring of biometric enrolment has increased.

Outcome 2: Social coherence is strengthened.

Outcome 3: An electoral conflict prevention mechanism is established and operational.

To achieve this, the project included the following activities/outputs:

- Training for the monitoring of biometric registration, and the monitoring itself.
- Awareness raising on the importance of biometric registration and social cohesion, and youth participation in this; using radio broadcasts, conferences, town criers, and public (humoristic) podium events.
- Training for the monitoring of violence, and the monitoring itself.
- Training for the establishment of a conflict prevention mechanism, focusing on the mediation of electoral conflicts through religious/traditional community leaders.
- Elaboration of a Code of Good Conduct for electoral candidates.

The primary target beneficiaries of the project were youth, women and political leaders. The objective was to directly involve some 6,500 individuals, as well as members of the wider public in locations covered by the project. The project was implemented in five regional capital cities/towns: Ouagadougou, Bobo Dioulasso, Ouahigouya, Dédougou and Ziniaré. These locations were chosen because they are the largest in electoral population terms, with

the exception of Ziniaré which was chosen due to its specific electoral challenges resulting from it being the region of origin of former President Compaoré.

The overall design of the project (with key assumptions, like an elementary Theory of Change) argued that if the project activities are carried out successfully then the involvement of young people, opinion formers and politicians for electoral mobilisation will be assured, which in turn will have the effect of increasing youth participation in the elections and calming the political climate.

All activities were completed, and reporting documents produced. Due to postponement of the voter registration campaign as a result of the deterioration of the security situation in the country, UNDEF agreed with the Grantee that instead of a Mid-Term Narrative Report, two Narrative Progress Reports would be submitted after Milestones 2 and 3 (M2 and M3).⁹ M2 (awareness raising humorous public events for social cohesion)¹⁰ was observed by Mr Jaime Palacios, UNDEF Programme Officer, on 21 June 2019. M3 (signature of code of good conduct by electoral process stakeholders) was self-monitored and reported by AJEA on 24 October 2020, as a representative of the office of the Resident Coordinator was unable to attend. This self-reporting was deemed acceptable given the levels of trust between UNDEF and the Grantee. Additionally, a desk review was deemed sufficiently suited to monitor such a milestone.

The budget for the project was USD 165,000 including Monitoring & Evaluation (M&E) costs of USD 15,000. There was a small underspend of USD 231.

III. EVALUATION METHODOLOGY

The evaluation focuses on the achievement of the project's outcomes, as well as on the impact and programme effectiveness in achieving its ultimate goals. It uses a set of standard Evaluation Questions in line with the OECD-DAC Criteria¹¹ and adapted and developed to fit the context of the project (see Annex 1). The evaluation framework was participatory and people-centred, whereby stakeholders and beneficiaries were the key actors of the evaluation process and not the mere objects of the evaluation.

The evaluation followed a four-step process: (1) engaging project management and conducting a preliminary desk review to describe the project and evaluation framework and consider remote data collection tools (Launch Note agreed on 16 February 2022); (2) gathering credible evidence; (3) consolidating data and writing the report; (4) sharing the draft report with the main users for feedback then finalisation.

⁹ As part of its standard procedure, UNDEF requires that the Grantee identify two observable activities as milestones (usually month 8 and month 16 of the project). These milestones are observed by either UNDEF or more often a UN representative in the field. If no one is available, UNDEF conducts a desk review of the reports provided by the grantee.

¹⁰ In the original PD, M2 was meant to be the end of biometric registration but due to delays in the electoral process beyond the control of the Grantee this other activity was chosen instead as it coincided with a field mission to Ouagadougou by the PO.

¹¹ See: <https://www.oecd.org/dac/evaluation/daccriteriaforevaluatingdevelopmentassistance.htm>.

As a result of the deteriorating security situation before and after the coup of 22-23 January 2022 a field mission to Burkina Faso was regrettably not possible, so the evaluation was conducted remotely. Special considerations were agreed in advance between UNDEF, the evaluator, and the Grantee, and included:

- For outreach and interviews, tools such as telephone, emails, WhatsApp, Zoom and Skype would be used in the data collection process. The type of tools chosen would be conditioned by the degree to which stakeholders felt comfortable using them. In other words, priority would be given to those tools with which the different stakeholders were most familiar. In practice, because of unreliable internet coverage in Burkina Faso, this meant that most communication was conducted through WhatsApp.
- The time scope of the data collection would be more flexible than in conventional evaluations where there is a field mission with clear limits. Consequently, the data generation stage could be expanded to adapt to the availability of the different stakeholders. It was anticipated that the information analysis stage would largely overlap with the information generation stage. In practice, this proved to be the case as it took several weeks to conduct a sufficient number of interviews.
- At the end of the data generation stage a preliminary findings session would be organised with the Grantee and UNDEF so that the evaluator could ensure that evidence had been collected and analysed correctly before writing the draft report. In practice, due to the time required to track down numerous interviewees, this did not happen, but findings and recommendations were shared with the Grantee as soon as it was possible to do so, and feedback incorporated into the final draft that was submitted to UNDEF.

Identified limitations when compared to conventional evaluations, and proposed mitigation measures, included:

- Engagement with the Grantee would not benefit from direct contact in the field, which usually allows for a healthy degree of interaction to build trust and understanding. *Mitigation:* Allow for adequate time to be spent over conference calls and with email exchanges to ensure that the ground had been fully prepared before moving to formal interviews. And continue with these exchanges during the interviews themselves to address any misunderstandings or information gaps.
- The volatility of the political and security context in Burkina Faso may make it difficult for certain stakeholders outside Ouagadougou to convene to take part in any discussions with the evaluator, remotely. *Mitigation:* No additional risks should be taken by anyone in connection with the evaluation.
- Engagement with beneficiaries/participants and third parties may not be as productive or inclusive as usual field visits allow. *Mitigation:* Special attention would be paid to the names and institutions selected for interview, and the manner by which people would be contacted – e.g. direct calls versus use of email exchanges/questionnaires. Similarly, the key questions to be asked would be as well-prepared in advance as possible, including feedback from the Grantee.

During the evaluation 18 people (13 men and 5 women) were consulted (see Annex 3), using a combination of WhatsApp messaging and video calls, and email exchanges.¹² **These numbers would have been higher without the political disruption caused by the events of 22-23 January 2022 - which resulted in a suspension of some key institutional activity, and relevant donors/members of the international community having less time than would normally be the case to contribute to the evaluation. Specific shortcomings in this regard are referenced in Section IV. Communication with some interviewees was occasionally hampered by poor internet and telephone connectivity, particularly in locations outside of Ouagadougou. Self-evidently, the evaluation would have benefited from more direct and longer contact with interviewees that a field mission would have allowed.**

Documents reviewed included: activity reports, progress reports, project documents, administrative reviews, and third-party documentation (see Annex 2). The evaluator also conducted more than 100 Internet searches in news, social networks and pages of different institutions and organisations. Some of these have been cited in this report (see Annex 2).

This final report presents the main findings and gives answers to evaluation questions based on evidence.

IV. EVALUATION FINDINGS

Evaluation criteria, questions and sub-questions are listed in full at Annex 1.

(i) *Relevance*

The evaluation addressed the following main question: To what extent was the project, as designed and implemented, suited to the context and needs at the Grantee, local and national levels?

Main findings:

- The project built on 15 years of AJEA experience of working with youth and civil society in Burkina Faso. For example, the Grantee collaborated on a project for the elections in 2015, targeting youth and women, funded by UNDP.¹³ Also in 2015, the Grantee and its implementing partner (RESOCEL) collaborated on a project that promoted observation of the elections by civil society, funded by the *Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie*.
- With agreement for the UNDEF project given almost two years before the elections of November 2020, the project was able to work “upstream” to cover important phases of the full electoral cycle – i.e. awareness raising, biometric registration, conflict prevention and resolution, monitoring, and the elections themselves.

¹² Nearly all these interactions were in French. Selected quotations used in Section IV have been translated into English by the evaluator.

¹³ *Projet d'éducation et de mobilisation des jeunes et des femmes pour les élections réussies au Burkina Faso*. No reporting on this was found online but in the PD the Grantee draws the following lessons learned from the experience: tailoring specific activities for youth and women as marginalised groups; the effectiveness of using comedy and humour as channels for social mobilisation; and the importance of networking with other CSOs.

- Five targeted geographical locations provided broad scope and coverage for the project, using the Grantee’s network of regional focal points.
- Religious and traditional community leaders were identified as having high levels of legitimacy for spreading key messages relating to the project and were used effectively.
- The project was gender-sensitive and target indicators for the participation of women in key events were exceeded.
- Risk mitigation was set out clearly in the original PD agreed on 31 December 2018. This included: identifying the north of the country most at risk of terrorist violence (and therefore limiting engagement there mostly to radio broadcasts); choice of relevant local languages; and possible delays to the elections. As the PD pre-dated COVID-19, the negative impacts of the pandemic on the project were not possible to foresee.

“This project was different to many other projects that are designed around a single event. It was very well thought out and planned. It helped to begin work upstream two years before the elections themselves, with activities that meant that all significant phases were covered.”

Mr Ousmane Konkobo, expert on elections and social mediation, and consultant for the project

“In this workshop we have examined different types of electoral violence, and their causes and consequences. Everything we have discussed is based on reality. It is our duty as traditional leaders to call for peace in the upcoming elections.”

Mr Baloum Naaba, traditional community leader, Tampouy (quoted in *Le Quotidien*, 12 May 2020, following a project event)

(ii) Coherence

The evaluation addressed the following main question: How well did the project “fit” - i.e. to what extent was the project compatible with other projects and programmes in the country, sector or institution?

Main findings:

- The 2020 elections in Burkina Faso were supported by numerous national institutional and social actors, and by the international community. The project was one among many interventions by CSOs, whose contributions were praised by the African Union (AU) Electoral Observation Mission: “The Mission acknowledges the essential role played by

civil society through its youth, of which it is mainly composed, in the prevention of tensions during the holding of the combined elections”.¹⁴

- In terms of “fitting in” and deconflicting with the broader range of civil society efforts, the Grantee signed an agreement with its main implementing partner (RESOCEL) for the carrying out of activities relevant to the monitoring of biometric enrolment and electoral violence. The Grantee also had strong links with the Ministry for Youth, the Independent National Electoral Commission (CENI), the National Commission for Human Rights (CNDH), and the national body representing religious and traditional community leaders (URCB/SD). Another significant organisation in promoting the role of civil society for the observation of elections in Burkina Faso (CODEL), although not directly involved in the project, confirmed to the evaluator that the Grantee was able to “... integrate the main actors for the electoral process to guarantee the success of its activities”.
- For coherence relating to activities supported by international donors, and the UN, the evaluator was unable to find evidence of how this was done in practice but did not find anything to suggest that this had been particularly problematic. For example, the UNDEF Project Officer was aware of planning being done by the UN DPPA Electoral Observation Division during a field mission visit to Ouagadougou in June-July 2019.¹⁵
- For the reasons expressed above, there appeared to be satisfactory synergies and complementarity between the project and other initiatives in support of the 2020 elections.

“RESOCEL, being a platform that groups together several associations for electoral observation, was able to see how the activities of the UNDEF project were much appreciated by the electoral commission - as well as political actors. Other partners funded similar work. There was excellent collaboration on the ground.”

Mr Lansane Dao, Coordinator of RESOCEL (Implementing Partner)

(iii) Effectiveness

The evaluation addressed the following main question: To what extent was the project, as implemented, able to achieve objectives and goals?

Main findings:

¹⁴ Mission d’Observation Électorale de l’Union Africaine – Burkina Faso, 21 December 2020 : <https://au.int/en/documents/20201221/aeom-election-report-burkina-faso>.

¹⁵ Note from a Needs Assessment Mission in June-July 2019, shared by the PO for this evaluation, in January 2022.

- Notwithstanding the volatile political and security context within which the project took place, and the COVID-19 pandemic, the project was able to deliver against the agreed outcomes¹⁶ as below.
- Outcome 1 (*“Youth participation in monitoring of biometric enrolment has increased”*). From AJEA reporting in the Final Narrative Report (FNR), targets for direct beneficiaries (youth and women) and indirect beneficiaries (wider community) were exceeded: 7,635 instead of 3,250 for direct beneficiaries, and 87,580 against 22,000 for indirect beneficiaries. These figures could be even higher if the full extent of media coverage is considered. There is, though, no baseline calculation to contextualise these findings. The baselines and indicators used in the original PD were not used in the FNR; nor were they referenced in the (otherwise detailed and highly informative) RESOCEL report on the monitoring of biometric enrolment for the period 1 January – 31 July 2020.
- Outcome 2 (*“Social cohesion is strengthened”*). Social cohesion is an important aspect of the project, though arguably difficult to measure. As above, AJEA reporting against target numbers for beneficiaries gives positive results: 3,992 instead of 3,065 for direct beneficiaries, and 247,062 instead of 8,000 for indirect beneficiaries. The evaluator also saw a selection of evaluation sheets (*fiches d’évaluation*) compiled by AJEA and two of these addressed social cohesion. One recorded the number of events where it was observed that “militants” from old and new political regimes attended the same events, and the other recorded incidents of social tension. Both sets of figures covered the five targeted regions over the period February-September 2019. It would have been useful to use these findings as a baseline and compare with another data set for the following year. AJEA explained to the evaluator that restrictions relating to COVID-19 effectively ruled this out. On a more qualitative level, interviewees expressed positive views about how social cohesion was strengthened through project activities, especially those relating to the popular podium events. “Absolutely!”, according to the President of the CNDH.
- Outcome 3 (*“An electoral conflict prevention mechanism is established and operational”*). Data for this in AJEA reporting also exceeded expectations, in terms of direct and indirect beneficiaries. Material results such as the training for religious and local leaders, and the signing of the Code of Good Conduct for electoral candidates, proved easier to measure. The latter was achieved later than planned, just one month before the November 2020 elections because of delays in the formalization and announcement of official candidates for the elections, and some of the political actors had to be represented by trusted partners for signature. It was though a widely appreciated initiative and is now a solid basis for future work in this area.
- There were no rotations or changes of project staff during the lifetime of the project.

(iv) *Efficiency*

The evaluation addressed the following main question: To what extent was there a reasonable relationship between resources expended and project impacts?

¹⁶ The evaluator understands ‘outcome’ to mean: behavioural, policy, procedure or budgetary change in target population/institution, partially attributable to project outputs, achievable by the end of the project, but more in the control of the project target population/institution.

Main findings:

- The project delivered activities and outputs¹⁷ in a coordinated manner and with a high degree of efficiency, which can be summarised in the table below. All numbers and activities referenced in the Achievements column meet the target indicators as framed in the PD.

Outputs	Achievements
<p>Output 1.1: 30 young leaders conduct monitoring of biometric registration in 5 cities. <i>(30 jeunes leaders effectuent le monitoring de l'enrôlement biométrique dans 5 villes du pays.)</i></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 30 young leaders from the selected five regions were trained in the monitoring of biometric registration, in a workshop held in Boromo during 24-26 November 2019. Other participants included a representative from the government majority in power, the political opposition, and CENI. • A report prepared by RESOCEL explains how teams were deployed to monitor biometric registration during 1 January – 31 July 2020. This contained conclusions and recommendations for CENI, government, political parties, civil society, and the international community.
<p>Output 1.2: The (young) populations of the targeted areas are sensitized to the importance of biometric registration in Burkina Faso. <i>(Les populations (jeunes) des zones cibles sont sensibilisées sur l'importance de l'enrôlement biométrique au Burkina Faso.)</i></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 5 public conferences in the targeted regions, in schools, were organized to promote the mass participation of young people in biometric registration. • Town criers (<i>crieurs publics</i>) were also used in each of the five regional centres. • 12 radio broadcasts in French and local languages¹⁸ (Mooré, Dioula and Fululdé) were carried out on the importance of biometric registration, through local radio partnerships. • 5 podium events were carried out on biometric registration, with comedians and opinion formers. These were deemed particularly successful. They were organised to coincide with market days, with high concentrations of local people – especially women. These events pre-dated COVID-19. Attending one of these events in Ouagadougou on 21 June 2019 the UNDEF Project Officer (Mr Jaime Palacios) reported: "... a large public performance led by local comedians and artists was held. Around 500 persons attended the event, from a vulnerable background [...] Participants have felt that the activities have been highly useful in raising their awareness of the necessity for Burkina Faso to achieve peaceful elections [...] Strong AJEA local team, with a solid capacity to mobilize the community. A resulting observation is that the target group – community, was extremely exposed to the activity as planned. The messaging on social cohesion was appropriately transmitted in an enjoyable but effective way."

¹⁷ The evaluator understands 'output' to mean tangible (infrastructure, equipment) products delivered/completed, changes in intangible (knowledge/skills) capacities of stakeholders as a result of project activities, and activities completed. Completely/significantly in the control of the project.

¹⁸ There are 70 listed languages in Burkina Faso. French is an official language, though it is not widely spoken. Mooré, the language of the Mossi, is spoken by a large majority of the population, and Dyula is widely used in commerce. For more on this see: <https://www.studycountry.com/guide/BF-language.htm>.

	
<p>Output 2.1: The populations of the targeted areas are sensitized to the need for social cohesion. <i>(Les populations des zones cibles sont sensibilisées sur la nécessité de la cohésion sociale.)</i></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 5 podium events were carried out on social cohesion, with comedians and opinion formers. These were separate events from those mentioned above, and were also deemed to be very impactful. One location (Karangasso Vigué) had, since the municipal elections of 2016, been the scene of communal violence, and relations across the political divides were very tense. It was noteworthy that the event brought many of these opposing forces together, on the evening, and this was acknowledged in press reporting at the time and a letter of appreciation from the Mayor, expressing “full joy and emotion [...] sincere gratitude [...] and congratulations and encouragements” to AJEA and UNDEF.¹⁹ The representative of the traditional leaders said at the end of the evening’s proceedings: “I thank the association for this beautiful initiative which has allowed all of us to be here this evening. I feel sure that if such an activity had taken place before the municipal elections of 2016, we would have been able to avoid all these crises that have shed so much blood.”²⁰ • 12 radio broadcasts in French and local languages were carried out on the importance of social cohesion (also separate from the broadcasts mentioned above). • 25 events (<i>sorties d’animation</i>) were organized with mobile town criers to promote mass mobilisation for social cohesion.
<p>Output 3.1: 30 young leaders conduct monitoring of violence in 5 cities during the elections of 2020. <i>(30 jeunes leaders effectuent le monitoring de la violence dans 5 villes du pays)</i></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Training of 30 young and female leaders (target was 45 women from a total of 125) on the monitoring of violence. • Monitoring of violence in the targeted five regions. • These activities were carried out notwithstanding challenges relating to the deteriorating security situation and COVID-19, and were also sponsored by the President of CNDH.

¹⁹ Letter from the Mayor of the Commune of Karangasso-Vigué, Region of Hauts-Bassins, dated 13 May 2019.

²⁰ Quoted on page 10 of Final Narrative Report of 28 January 2021.

<i>lors des élections de 2020.)</i>	
<p>Output 3.2: The mediation framework for electoral conflict is operational in 5 cities during the elections of 2020. (<i>Le cadre de médiation des conflits électoraux est fonctionnel dans 5 villes du pays lors des élections de 2020.</i>)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 25 religious, traditional and political leaders were trained on electoral violence – representing the targeted five regions, over three days in Ouagadougou. (Target was 8 religious leaders, 7 traditional leaders, and 10 politicians.) Day 1 was focused on the role of elections in democracy; Day 2 looked at techniques for conflict resolution; Day 3 was dedicated to practical exercises for conflict resolution. • A Code of Good Conduct for electoral candidates was drafted by expert consultants and agreed and signed by party political stakeholders. Delays in the formalization and announcement of official candidates for the elections (due to insecurity and COVID-19) meant that some of the political actors had to be represented by trusted partners for signature. This part of the project was self-monitored by AJEA as milestone M3, who reported: “A workshop on 24 October 2020 brought together 35 participants – candidates, representatives of candidates, civil society leaders, and journalists. The Code of Good Conduct was adopted unanimously by all of the participants. The candidates agreed to come under the mediation of religious and traditional leaders through the URCB/SD, in the event of future conflict to be resolved, and to respect the terms of the Code”.

- Project performance, cost-effectiveness and accountability were supported by a project steering committee convened by AJEA which met monthly and comprised three core staff members from AJEA and two external “commissioners”.
- The two external expert consultants hired for the project were selected through transparent and fair competition and added significant value – for example in the design and delivery of training tools and the drafting of the Code of Good Conduct. The use of the AJEA regional focal points to facilitate activities outside of Ouagadougou was also well-conceived and effective – though one of these focal points told the evaluator that he would have welcomed more information from AJEA in Ouagadougou about other project activities in the country once the event he was responsible for had passed.
- There was a small (USD 231) underspend of the budget. The Financial Utilization Report of 8 February 2021 did not include an audit narrative but the evaluator found no evidence to suggest that the application of funds had not complied with the provisions of the Grant Agreement. Additional costs relating to security protection and hygiene measures at some events were absorbed by AJEA’s core budget.

(v) *Impact*

The evaluation addressed the following main question: To what extent has the project put in place processes and procedures supporting the role of civil society in contributing to the objectives of the project and democratization more broadly?

Main findings:

- Noting that the overall objective of the project was **to contribute to increasing youth participation in the combined legislative and presidential elections of 22 November 2020**, the evaluator worked with the Grantee to try and compare evidence from the 2015 and 2020 elections. Despite various attempts to extract the relevant data from CENI, information received was incomplete and inconclusive.²¹ On the other hand, all relevant stakeholders interviewed for the evaluation were confident that youth participation in 2020 had increased from 2015, including a representative from the Ministry for Youth.
- The project demonstrated the ability of civil society actors and organisations in Burkina Faso to contribute significantly to the democratic electoral process in 2019-2020 by helping calm the political climate and increasing awareness of political rights among the wider population, especially youth – despite the many challenges associated with a deteriorating security situation and the COVID-19 pandemic. In this regard, it can be said that the project impacted positively on the three priority problems identified in the original PD of December 2018: low inscription levels of young people on the electoral register; social and political tension generated by the mass protests of 2014; fresh outbreaks of electoral violence.
- Whether the project will have achieved catalytic effect is more difficult to judge in the current circumstances, meaning the evolving transitional political arrangements following the military coup of 22-23 January 2022. Any positive democratizing momentum gained from the elections of 2020, including the contribution made by the project (however modest), deserves to be recognised and used to best effect in the period ahead.

“Youth is the spearhead of a country’s development and any initiative that can channel the positive energy of youth for peaceful elections is to be encouraged [...] The contribution of CSOs in the participation of young people in the 2020 elections has been invaluable. They were able to quell the fears surrounding the holding of the elections. Thanks to the work that was done, an electoral crisis was avoided even though the security situation was very tense.”

Mme Zeinab Tahar Hamza Diaby, Head of the OHCHR Country Office in Burkina Faso

(vi) Sustainability

The evaluation addressed the following main question: To what extent has the project, as designed and implemented, created what is likely to be a continuing impetus towards democratic development? Self-evidently, this question became more difficult to answer following the military coup of 22-23 January 2022 and the evolving transitional political

²¹ CENI’s reticence to share more complete data may be explained by the political tensions following the coup of 22-23 January 2022, and rumours about its future existence during the transition period.

arrangements currently in play in Burkina Faso – with elections to allow a return to civilian rule not expected before 2025.

Main findings:

- Perhaps due to a relatively small international community presence in Burkina Faso, the influence of CSOs is less well reported and understood than in other countries in the region. This may soon change with recent regional civil society initiatives such as the *Coalition citoyenne pour le Sahel*²² founded in April 2021 – which has strong representation from Burkina Faso. The positive contribution of CSOs to the future democratic development of Burkina Faso seems set to continue.
- The Grantee’s strong track record over more than 15 years, and experience gained from the project, would have been good reasons to take an active role in the debate around reform of the electoral code in Burkina Faso – which was suspended after the coup. The project’s legacies should, though, be able to support democratic development in other ways. The Code of Good Conduct is a solid foundation on which to build for future electoral cycles. Awareness raising through creative and impactful social events, such as the project’s podium events, are likely to remain in demand. The Grantee has also begun to identify other possible opportunities for engagement with the new transitional authorities, such as the Ministry for Territorial Administration.
- The Grantee appears to be well placed to take forward work initiated by the project supported by other means, with recent and ongoing support from, among others, the Royal Danish Embassy in Ouagadougou and the National Democratic Institute.

“The strengthening of the capacity of actors responsible for elections, and raising awareness of the general population, have inevitably impacted on the process of democratization in Burkina Faso. The understanding that young people now have of their participation in elections, and of their vote, and the promotion of conflict prevention, all contributed to the holding of peaceful elections that were accepted by all.”

Mr Rodrigue Namoano, President of the National Human Rights Commission (CNDH)

“We have three years of transition ahead of us. We see more interest on the part of young people, who are more visible in the political space than before.”

Mr Mahamadi Sinka, AJEA regional “Focal Point” for Hauts-Bassins

²² Coalition citoyenne pour le Sahel. See: *Sahel : Ce qui doit changer – Pour une nouvelle approche centrée sur les besoins des populations*, April 2021:

<https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5f524b4f15baeb6e140e38fc/t/60756eabed9c8568ed98cb30/1618308790844/Sahel+Ce+q+ui+doit+changer+-+Rapport+Coalition+citoyenne.pdf>.

(vii) *UNDEF added value*

The evaluation addressed the following main question: To what extent was UNDEF able to take advantage of its unique position and comparative advantage to achieve results that could not have been achieved had support come from other donors?

Main findings:

- There was broad agreement among those interviewed for the evaluation that UNDEF enjoyed a neutral/impartial reputation that lent itself well to the sensitizing nature of the project. There was also recognition that, unlike many sponsored projects for the 2020 elections that focused almost exclusively on the election events of November 2020, UNDEF (because of its mandate) was well suited to invest “upstream” in project activity, beginning in the early stages of biometric enrolment, that successfully covered all key phases of the electoral cycle.
- UNDEF support for the project was visible in publicity materials for events, during the events themselves, and for outcome documents recording agreements.
- There was good visibility for UNDEF support in the written press. There was no confusion between the use of the French acronym for UNDP (PNUD) with the French acronym for UNDEF (FNUD) as has occurred elsewhere in the region.
- The Grantee maintains references to the UNDEF project in social media, though the last entry on the project on its Facebook page is from May 2020 – meaning there is nothing on the production and promotion of the Code of Good Conduct or the November 2020 elections themselves.



“UNDEF is undoubtedly best placed for this kind of initiative, with its mandate focused on promoting democracy and human rights, and the support it can give Civil Society Organisations.”

Mr Larba Pilga, Director General for the Promotion of Youth, Ministry for Youth

V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Conclusion	Recommendation
<p>The project made a solid contribution to the democratic development of Burkina Faso. Some momentum has inevitably been lost with the military coup of January 2022, but aspects of the project should be preserved for use during the transition period and future elections.</p> <p>Although on a modest scale, the project has impacted positively on the democratic development of Burkina Faso – at a time, during 2019-2020, when democratic gains from the 2015 elections needed to be sustained and extended. Spreading over the full electoral cycle (from registration to ballot day) it comprised well planned and executed interventions that exceeded expectations in terms of direct and indirect beneficiaries and media outreach. Gains in youth participation, conflict prevention and resolution, public awareness raising, and use of religious and traditional community leaders to reinforce key messages – are considerable achievements. And all of this against the backdrop of a highly volatile political and security situation, and COVID-19. Experience and materials from the project (such as the creative use of public podium events with professional entertainers, the groundwork done for the Code of Good Conduct, and conflict resolution) are highly transferable to the realities of the current context following the coup of 22-23 January 2022 – and the transition period before the next elections possibly in 2025. In the words of a representative of the Ministry for Youth: “AJEA has a real role to play in the future democratic development of Burkina Faso.”</p>	<p>Experience, lessons and materials from the project should be captured and kept in play as valid contributions for the transition period and the next elections – expected in 2025. Of particular value are the positive responses to the social outreach (podium) events, use of religious/traditional leaders for conflict prevention and resolution, and the Code of Good Conduct.</p>
<p>The project was well covered in the local and national media – through radio, television, and printed press. The impact on social media is less clear.</p> <p>The Grantee made good use of their established</p>	<p>AJEA could consider ways of making more project information available online through its Facebook page – for example by providing links to key documents (such as the Code of Good Conduct), and by helping readers understand the impact of projects that have</p>

<p>links and relations with the media (e.g. BF1 television, and local radio broadcasters). It is less clear how project activities impacted on social media. For example, on the AJEA website, the last reference to project activities is from May 2020 – i.e. missing out on the production of the Code of Good Conduct and the November 2020 elections themselves.</p>	<p>concluded, and any lessons learned. This could be particularly useful in the transition period currently underway, and for preparations for the next elections.</p>
<p>Project design and reporting would have benefited from more rigorous use of baselines and target indicators in the Results Framework.</p> <p>The original PD was well presented, with good levels of detail to describe the nature of the problems being addressed, with credible baselines and indicators. When one compares this with the Final Narrative Report (FNR), many of the activities of the project appear to be under reported and some of the indicators at Outcome level have been overlooked. For example, under Outcome 1 the baselines and indicators used in the original PD are not referenced by the RESOCEL report on biometric monitoring that was intended to capture the detail of the results – and are completely missing in the FNR. Instead, the FNR focuses on numbers of people trained and attendance at public events – instead of seeking to identify numbers of people enrolled. Similarly, measuring “social cohesion” (Outcome 2) is challenging and the metrics used in the FNR (number of people exposed to project activities) moves away from the original intention of monitoring political representation at such events, over time.²³</p> <p>The evaluation has noted the problems posed by the deteriorating security situation, COVID-19 and other challenges which limited Monitoring & Evaluation efforts in 2020 – especially as these related to the use of evaluation tools at public</p>	<p>UNDEF guidance for Grantees online, in English and French, is comprehensive – including on best practice for Results Frameworks. Checking progress against Results Frameworks is an integral part of monitoring progress, in addition to the established practice of reporting on Milestones. Grantees need to take these reporting obligations seriously, given (a) they exist to help grantees self-monitor progress and (b) they facilitate the UNDEF Project Officer’s understanding of actual progress by providing snap-shot-type measurements at the time of reporting.</p> <p>AJEA should review the guidance and reflect on how they might have improved on their end-of-project reporting. Learning from this would stand them in good stead for any future UNDEF, or other, project work.</p>

²³ A useful introduction to the challenges associated with measuring social cohesion is: Jenson J., *Defining and Measuring Social Cohesion*, Commonwealth Secretariat and UN Research Institute for Social Development, 2010. Available at: <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/785809?ln=en>.

events and the inability to extract hard data from CENI.	
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VI. LESSONS LEARNED

Some key lessons can be learned from the project that could be applied to other projects either in the same region or on the same theme.

- Where **demographic trends demonstrate a rapidly growing young population**, as is the case in much of West Africa and the Sahel region, CSOs with a focus on youth (and associated challenges of social cohesion) are likely to be suitably impactful beneficiaries of support from UNDEF and other donors.
- International support for elections in fragile and conflict-affected countries, including contributions from civil society, may often require sensitive **coordination to maximise impact and avoid duplication of effort**. OHCHR Human Rights Advisers and OHCHR Country Offices (where they exist, as is now the case in Burkina Faso) seem particularly well qualified to take a leading role in such coordination – e.g. with stakeholder mapping, and as champions for civil society engagement.
- When supporting electoral processes **there is clear value in working “upstream” to cover, and connect, key aspects of the full electoral cycle** (e.g. registration, awareness raising, monitoring, conflict prevention and resolution) before the election event itself. Where possible, this can also include linkages with initiatives promoting access to information and freedom of speech – i.e. ensuring that electoral choices are as well informed as possible and contribute to community dialogue and improving social cohesion. A new civil society platform for the Sahel, the *Coalition citoyenne pour le Sahel*, appears to be a promising forum just such interaction.
- **Sensitivity to local languages** should be an essential part of project design and delivery in countries where such diversity exists, though this may bring additional challenges in terms of measuring and evaluating the success of an intervention.
- **Grantees need to be disciplined in their monitoring and reporting, making best use of the comprehensive guidance available on the UNDEF website**. Grantees should feel free to suggest to UNDEF alternative baselines, target indicators and means of verification if data collection against initially planned Results Frameworks proves more difficult than expected or impossible.

ANNEXES

Annex 1: Evaluation Questions

DAC criterion	Evaluation Question	Related sub-questions
Relevance	To what extent was the project, as designed and implemented, suited to the context and needs at the Grantee, local and national levels?	<p>Has the project done the right things?</p> <p>Key contextual elements: the ongoing democratisation process following the first multiparty elections of 2015 and the continuing deteriorating security situation impacting, especially, the north of the country at the time of the 2020 elections.</p> <p>Was there an adequate risk mitigation strategy in place?</p>
Coherence	How well did the project “fit” - i.e. to what extent was the project compatible with other projects and programmes in the country, sector or institution?	<p><i>Internal coherence:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> To what extent are there synergies and interlinkages between the project and other initiatives carried out by the Grantee? <p><i>External coherence:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> To what extent is there consistency with other actors’ initiatives in the same context? To what extent is there complementarity, harmonisation and coordination between the Grantee/the project and other organisations/projects working in the same context and on the same issue? To what extent is the project adding value while avoiding the duplication of efforts? <p>A key area: the provision of electoral observation in 2020 provided by other actors, whether they be civil society (e.g. CODEL) or international (e.g. AU) and broader support for the electoral process delivered by the UN.</p>

Effectiveness	<p>To what extent was the project, as implemented, able to achieve objectives and goals?</p>	<p>Taking into account the volatile political and security context within which the project took place, the evaluator will assess the extent to which the project’s objectives have been reached and how this has been measured.</p> <p>The evaluator will assess whether the activities of the project linked up, achieved the agreed indicators, and provided the best approach to achieving the outcomes and objectives.</p> <p>Outcome 1: Was there an increase in youth participation in biometric monitoring?</p> <p>Outcome 2: Was social cohesion strengthened?</p> <p>Outcome 3: What were the positive benefits of the “operational electoral conflict prevention mechanism”? – i.e. the training of electoral conflict mediation leaders and the signing of a Code of Good Conduct.</p> <p>Did any rotation of project management staff have an impact on the effectiveness of project implementation?</p>
Efficiency	<p>To what extent was there a reasonable relationship between resources expended and project impacts?</p>	<p>The project was completed within budget and no major changes or problems were recorded. However, the evaluator will take the opportunity of talking to the Grantee to learn in more detail how the project was run and resourced.</p> <p>How well were resources used? To what extent did the project deliver results in an economic and timely way? Did institutional arrangements promote cost-effectiveness and accountability?</p> <p>The evaluator will look into how the project was organised and how cost-effective it was. This will include the selection and use of the key consultants and regional focal points for delivery of the project.</p> <p>Was there a reasonable relationship between project inputs and project outputs?</p>

Impact	To what extent has the project put in place processes and procedures supporting the role of civil society in contributing to the objectives of the project and democratization more broadly?	<p>What difference has the project made? To what extent did the project generate significant positive higher-level effects?</p> <p>To what extent has the meeting of project objectives and outcomes had an impact on the specific problems the project aimed to address?</p> <p>Did the project have a catalytic effect?</p>
Sustainability	To what extent has the project, as designed and implemented, created what is likely to be a continuing impetus towards democratic development?	<p>Are the net benefits of the project likely to continue?</p> <p>What measures did the Grantee put in place to ensure sustainability of achieved results?</p> <p>To what extent will the Grantee be able to take forward work initiated by the project, supported by other means?</p> <p>To what extent is the Grantee, based on its experience and achievements from the project, contributing to the current debate/activity around reform of the electoral code in Burkina Faso?</p>
UNDEF value added	To what extent was UNDEF able to take advantage of its unique position and comparative advantage to achieve results that could not have been achieved had support come from other donors?	<p>This will be assessed in relation to other initiatives in the country that may have the same aims, and the comparative advantage that UNDEF offered to the Grantee.</p> <p>Could the objectives have been achieved through alternative projects, other donors, or other stakeholders?</p> <p><i>UNDEF value-added</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • How far did UNDEF funding provide value added to the work of AJEA? <p><i>UNDEF visibility</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Is there evidence showing that UNDEF support to the Grantee appears in all printed materials distributed during the project? • Does UNDEF visibility appear also in all events organised by the Grantee which are related to the project?

Annex 2: Documents Reviewed

Project Documents and Reporting:

- Document de Projet & Budget, 31 December 2018.
- Milestone Verification Report 2, 3 July 2019.
- Rapport d'Utilisation Financière 2, June & September 2019.
- Rapport Narratif 2, 31 July 2019.
- Rapport d'Utilisation Financière 3, 14 May 2020.
- Rapport d'Observation 3, 30 November 2020.
- Rapport Narratif 3, 2 January 2021.
- Financial Utilisation Report 3, 14 May 2020.
- Rapport Narratif Final, 28 January 2021.
- Rapport d'Utilisation Financière Final, 8 February 2021.
- PO Field Monitoring Mission Report from visit to Ouagadougou 19-20 June 2019.
- PO Information Note for Post-Project Evaluation, undated but received December 2021.
- Selection of press cuttings during implementation of project supplied by AJEA, and reporting of project activities on their Facebook page at <https://www.facebook.com/ajea226>.

Other Sources:

African Union

- *Rapport de la Mission d'Observation Électorale de l'Union africaine pour les élections générales du 22 novembre 2020 au Burkina Faso*, published 21 December 2020 at <https://au.int/en/documents/20201221/aeom-election-report-burkina-faso>.

Association Jeunesse Espoir d'Afrique (AJEA)

- Website: <https://ajea.jimdofree.com/actualite/>.
- Facebook: <https://www.facebook.com/ajea226>.

Christopher Belanger, Goethie Derenoncourt and C.G. Landry

- The Norman Paterson School of International Affairs at Carleton University, *STATE FRAGILITY IN BURKINA FASO Analysis and Policy Brief*, Fall 2020: <https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Burkina-Faso-Fragility-Brief-2021.pdf>

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- *Sahel : Ce qui doit changer – Pour une nouvelle approche centrée sur les besoins des populations*, April 2021 : <https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5f524b4f15baeb6e140e38fc/t/60756eabed9c8568ed98cb30/1618308790844/Sahel+Ce+qui+doit+changer+-+Rapport+Coalition+citoyenne.pdf>.

CODEL (Convention des Organisations de la société civile pour l'Observation Domestique des Élections)

- *Élections Couplées Présidentielle et Législatives du 22 Novembre 2020*, article dated 20 April 2021 at <https://www.codel.bf/rapport-dobservation-des-elections-couplees-presidentielle-et-legislatives-de-2020-au-burkina-faso/>.
- *Rapport de l'Observation des Élections Couplées Présidentielle et Législatives du 22 novembre 2020 au Burkina Faso*, also available at above link.

DCAF (Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance)

- *Critical Human Security Issues in Burkina Faso*, 17 September 2021, at <https://www.dcaf.ch/critical-human-security-issues-burkina-faso>.

Freedom House

- *Freedom In The World 2021 (Burkina Faso)*, at <https://freedomhouse.org/country/burkina-faso/freedom-world/2021>.

ICCT (International Centre for Counter-Terrorism)

- *Acteurs coutumiers dans un context singulier – Le cas de la région du Sahel au Burkina Faso*, December 2021: https://icct.nl/app/uploads/2022/02/ICCT-Report_1_FR_The_case_of_Sahel_4thproof.pdf.

IDEA (International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance)

- *Guide to Risk Factors for Elections in the G5 Sahel Region Factors Internal to the Electoral Process*, 2020: <https://www.idea.int/sites/default/files/publications/guide-to-risk-factors-for-elections-g5-sahel-region-internal.pdf>

International Crisis Group (all reports available at <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/sahel/burkina-faso>)

- *Crisis Watch Burkina Faso (November 2021)*
- *A Course Correction for the Sahel Stabilisation Strategy* (1 February 2021)
- *The Social Roots of Jihadist Violence in Burkina Faso's North* (12 October 2017)
- *Burkina Faso et Niger: des élections à l'épreuve des insurrections?* (19 November 2020)

Jenson J.

- *Defining and Measuring Social Cohesion*, Commonwealth Secretariat and UN Research Institute for Social Development, 2010.

Prewitt K., Mackie C.D., Haberman H. (Eds)

- *Civic Engagement and Social Cohesion: Measuring Dimensions of Social Capital to Inform Policy*, National Research Council of the National Academies, Washington DC, 2014.

Samson Mwin Sôg Mé Dabiré

- *Constitutionalism and Political Transition in Burkina Faso*, 2021: <https://blog-iacl-aidc.org/2021-posts/2021/10/18/constitutionalism-and-political-transition-in-burkina-faso-3f2gc>

UN in Burkina Faso: <https://burkinafaso.un.org/fr/about/about-the-un>.

UN DPPA Electoral Observation Division

- Note from a Needs Assessment Mission in June-July 2019, shared by the PO.
- Report of the Secretary General: *Strengthening the role of the United Nations in enhancing periodic and genuine elections and the promotion of democratization*, 3 August 2021 (A/76/266).

UN OHCHR

- Address by UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Michelle Bachelet, at the conclusion of her visit to Burkina Faso on 1 December 2021, at <https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=27887&LangID=E>.
- Burkina Faso homepage: <https://www.ohchr.org/en/countries/africaregion/pages/bfindex.aspx>.

USAID

- *Democracy, Human Rights & Governance Factsheet*, April 2021, at https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Burkina_Faso_DRG_Fact_Sheet_April_2021_ENGLISH.pdf.

Various - other online reporting

- Lefaso.net (L'actualité du Burkina Faso sur Internet), at <https://lefaso.net/>.
- BBC, at <https://www.bbc.com/news/topics/ce1qrvlelrrt/burkina-faso>.
- Al Jazeera, at <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/12/9/what-you-need-to-know-about-burkina-fasos-political-crisis>.
- Le Monde, at <https://www.lemonde.fr/burkina-faso/>.
- Jeune Afrique, at <https://www.jeuneafrique.com/pays/burkina-faso/>.

Annex 3: People Consulted

Grantee & Implementing Agency

- AJEA
 - Mr Siriki Naon, Executive Secretary and Project Coordinator
 - Mr Sahid Kobeane, Monitoring and Evaluation
 - Ms Emiline Ouedraogo, Financial Officer

Implementing Partners

- RESOCEL
 - Mr Lansane Dao, RESOCEL Coordinator and previous Commissioner at CENI
- Consultants
 - Mr Ousmane Konkobo (part of support network of CENI)
 - Mr Ollo Christian Momo (currently working in UNCAR as election expert)
- Artists
 - Mr Adama Konate, script-writer of *Les Gros Ventres*.
- Regional Focal Points
 - Mr Mahamadi Sinka, Hauts-Bassins.
 - Mr Daouda Belem, Nord.
 - Mr Ousmane Lingani, Plateau Central.

Beneficiaries/Participants

- CENI
 - Mme Esther Some, Secretary General.
- CNDH
 - Mr Rodrigue Namoano, President.
- Ministère de la Jeunesse²⁴
 - Mr Larba Pilga, Director General for Youth and Life Long Education

Other National Actors

- CODEL
 - Mme Lydia Ouedraogo Zanga, Ex-Executive Secretary.

International Community

- UN OHCHR
 - Ms Zeinab Tahar Hamza Diaby, Head of OHCHR Country Office – Burkina Faso.
 - Mr Antonio Menendez de Zubillaga, former Human Rights Adviser, UNCT.

Independent Experts

- Ms Beatriz de Leó Cobo, Independent consultant on security and stabilisation in the Sahel, and Coordinator of the expert group Forum de dialogue Sahel-Europe (Centro de Seguridad Internacional – Universidad Francisco de Vitoria), Université de Paris, France.
- Mr Julien Joly, Small Arms Survey, Geneva.

²⁴ At the time of the interview there was no formal government in place, and Ministries, strictly speaking, were not functioning.

Annex 4: Acronyms

AJEA	Association Jeunesse Espoir d'Afrique
AU	African Union
CENI	Commission électorale national indépendante
CFOP	Chef de File de l'Opposition
CNDH	Commission nationale des droits humains
CODEL	Convention des organisations de la société civile pour l'observation domestique des élections
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
MPP	Mouvement du Peuple pour le Progrès
MPSR	Mouvement patriotique pour la sauvegarde et la restauration
OECD-DAC	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development - Development Assistance Committee
OHCHR	(UN) Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
PD	Project Document
RESOCEL	Réseau des organisations de la société civile pour une observation citoyenne des élections
UNDEF (FNUD)	United Nations Democracy Fund (FNUD using French acronym)
URCB/SD	Union des religieux et coutumiers du Burkina Faso pour la promotion de la santé et le développement