network

At the time the project began, the process of ratifying the African Charter on Democracy, Elections, and Governance, adopted by the African Union in January 2007, was moribund and there was no international project activity to invigorate it. The objective of the project was to strengthen civil society actors to build a constituency for the signing and ratification of the Charter. At the time the project was proposed, 15 ratifications were needed to bring the Charter into force, two countries (Ethiopia and Mauritania) had ratified the Charter and twenty-five had signed it, thus indicating their intention to ratify. Assessing the impact of the project was not easy. The intended direct beneficiaries were members of the African democracy community, whose network and ability to advocate for the Charter were strengthened. It is not possible, based on the timetable of ratifications and project activities, to convincingly demonstrate that the project greatly accelerated the coming into force of the Charter. Only three countries in which activities were implemented actually ratified the Charter. The project objective was not ratification itself but rather strengthening the advocacy community and facilitating ratification yet achieving ratification in target countries was an implicit objective of the project Ultimately, the sustainability of the project activity will also be a function of political will. The project was born of policy elites, implemented by policy elites, delivered results of direct relevance only to policy elites, yet promises substantial benefits to all the people of Africa, who will benefit from democracy.

The project aimed to bring together a diverse group of civil society organizations in Egypt and to work towards building a consensus among them on the principles and contents of a “democratic agenda”. It also sought to strengthen the knowledge base of those civil society groups committed to building a democratic society and state, while also enhancing public awareness of the need for, and character of, democracy. Instead of identifying a number of critical beneficiary and/or stakeholder groups and working with them throughout, the grantee worked with groups (Parliamentarians; Political Parties; Political and Social Movements; Trade Unions and Professional Syndicates; and, Youth Organizations, other civil society groups and the media) separately through one-off activities. The project then failed to adopt an approach to enable it to work systematically to bring these same groups together around a common agenda.

Aiming to empower young government and civil society leaders from southern Africa to catalyze transformative change in their home institutions and communities, the project had indeed a positive impact on some participants, both professionally and personally. It comprised of four principal components: training, support to “personal reform” projects developed by the trainees, integration of the trainees into an existing network, and evaluation of the reform projects with a view to identifying good practice and replicable initiatives. Overall, however, it represented poor value for money for UNDEF taking into account the high cost (US$350,000), relatively small number of participants, lack of strategies for broader engagement and inadequate outcomes.